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I. INTRODUCTION
"'This body willfully confirming the election of a person sexually active
outside of holy matrimony has departed from the historic faith and order of
the Church of Jesus Christ' . . . . [This body] has 'divided itself from
millions of Anglicans throughout the world."" These words and others like
them were among the first shots fired in what may turn out to be
Armageddon for The Episcopal Church. The occasion for Bishop Robert
Duncan's comments was the headline-making August 2003 election of the
Rev. V. Gene Robinson, an openly practicing homosexual, to be the
Episcopal Bishop of the Diocese of New Hampshire.2 The controversial
decision sparked an already-smoldering debate centered on scriptural
interpretation and resulting moral norms that has raged unabated ever since.
Like many conflicts in American society, this one has found its way into
the legal system. Just over a year later, on August 17, 2004, St. James
Church and All Saints Church, two traditionalist 3 Episcopal congregations in
1. Statement of the Rt. Rev. Robert Duncan, Episcopal Bishop of Pittsburgh, on the
Consecration of the Rt. Rev. V. Gene Robinson as Episcopal Bishop of New Hampshire, quoted in
Rachel Zoll, Episcopalians Elect Gay Bishop, Moving Church Closer to a Possible Split,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 5, 2003.
2. See, e.g., Zoll, supra note 1.
3. It is a struggle to find a workable nomenclature for the two archetypical positions in the
current debates in American mainline denominations. While the extreme positions are quite distinct,
it is often difficult to categorize individuals or groups that fall somewhere in between. For the
purposes of this article, the author has elected to use the designations "traditionalist" and
"progressive," on the supposition that those labels strike the best balance between an accurate
description of the positions and acceptability to those who hold the positions. "Traditionalist"
generally signifies opposition to changes in historical Christian teaching, particularly on matters of
sexual morality, while "progressive" generally signifies a willingness to consider such changes.
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the Diocese of Los Angeles, announced they were disaffiliating from The
Episcopal Church and placing themselves under the jurisdiction of an
Archbishop in Uganda; a third Southern California church, St. David's,
joined in the move a week later.4 On September 7, the Diocese of Los
Angeles filed lawsuits against the three churches in their respective county
courts, seeking "to secure and protect the church properties which are owned
in trust by the Episcopal Church, the Diocese, and our faithful
parishioners." 5 In response, the churches issued a press release stating that
"[t]he local churches hold the deeds to these properties, and hundreds of
church families have raised money to acquire and build them."6
The same arguments were raised in December 2006, when eleven
Episcopal congregations in Virginia, including two of the largest and most
historic Episcopal parishes7 in the country, voted to sever ties with the
Diocese of Virginia.8 The Diocese and the churches, which announced they
were joining the Anglican Church of Nigeria's Convocation of Anglicans in
North America, had agreed to a thirty-day standstill agreement foreclosing
civil litigation. 9 But in January 2007, the Diocese announced it would not
renew the agreement, signaling its intention to go to court to assert
ownership of the property via a purported trust in favor of the Diocese and
the national church.' A spokesman for one of the parishes asserted that
"[d]enominational trusts in congregational property are not valid in the
Commonwealth of Virginia."" On January 31, 2007, lawsuits were filed
against the eleven departing congregations in their relevant jurisdictions by
Although the terms "liberal" and "conservative" are fairly accurate when applied to the two sides'
respective theologies, they cannot but invite comparisons to American political philosophies. These
comparisons are not only often pejorative, but are also likely to be inaccurate, as the correlation
between theological liberals and conservatives and their political counterparts is by no means rigid.
4. Larry B. Stammer, Parishes Split Off Over Gay Issues, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2004, at BI;
Larry B. Stammer, North Hollywood Parish Is Third to Leave the Episcopal Church, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2004, at BI.
5. Episcopal Diocese of Los Angeles Sues Three Breakaway Parishes, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, Sept. 7, 2004 (quoting Bishop J. Jon Bruno, head of the Episcopal Diocese of Los
Angeles) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
6. Id.
7. Although "parish" is generally understood to signify local congregations in the Roman
Catholic and Anglican traditions, the author has taken the liberty of utilizing the term throughout to
signify local congregations of any tradition, as against the relevant national church body.
8. Natasha Altamirano, Church Dispute Headed to Court; Diocese Assets 'Abandoned,' WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A01.
9. Dionne Walker, Diocese Will Not Renew 30-Day Agreement Avoiding Litigation,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Jan. 9, 2007.
10. Id.; see also Altamirano, supra note 8.
11. Altamirano, supra note 8.
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the Diocese, which asserted its ownership and asked the court to order the
congregations to vacate the properties. 12
These competing conceptions of property rights are merely the tip of a
church-state iceberg that includes the First Amendment's religion clauses,
over two hundred years of American jurisprudence, and the unique polity of
hierarchical, quasi-hierarchical, and presbyterial religious organizations.' 3
These bodies, including most prominently The Episcopal Church (TEC or
ECUSA 14), the Presbyterian Church (United States of America) (PC(USA)),
and the United Methodist Church (UMC),"5 have been plagued by internal
strife over theological innovations for decades, and the civil courts are all
too frequently called on to resolve disputes over who owns property that
departing congregations have been using.
Although congregational disaffiliation from mainline churches 16 is not a
new phenomenon, 7 the current disputes threaten the deepest divisions yet.
12. Michelle Boorstein & Jacqueline L. Salmon, Diocese Sues 11 Seceding Congregations Over
Property Ownership, WASH. POST, Feb, 1, 2007, at B04.
13. Although this article (as well the precedential cases to which it refers) refers primarily to
Protestant Christian organizations, the principles are applicable to any religious body organized on
similar lines. As Professor Greenawalt said in his article on the same general subject:
All the important cases involve various Christian churches, and I refer to churches in
general, but whatever standards apply to churches also apply to all analogous religious
groups-Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, and so on. The concern here is not just one
of terminology. As the variety of religious practices within the country continues to
increase, so will the number of cases involving non-Christian groups. The standards for
engagement of civil law with Christian churches will also apply to other religious groups
with which most judges are much less familiar.
Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 1843, 1846 (1998).
14. See, e.g., Ruth Gledhill, Ecusa is No More, Long Live The Episcopal Church, TIMESONLINE
(UK), June 13, 2006, http://timescolumns.typepad.com/gledhill/2006/06/ecusa-grow-in l.html
("Canon Bob Williams of the Episcopal News Service was anxious to ensure that when writing
about the Episcopal Church we should not refer to it as Ecusa any more. Since there are 16 countries
that make up the Episcopal Church, he said, it would be better to refer to The Episcopal Church, or
TEC .... ).
15. Although the United Methodist Church is governed by the same standards as other mainline
denominations, there are several notable differences in the way it handles church property. Much of
this article will be readily applicable to situations involving Methodist bodies, but a much more
specific treatment may be found in Thomas C. Oden, Considerations Specific to Methodists, in A
GUIDE TO CHURCH PROPERTY LAW 87-117 (Lloyd J. Lunceford gen. ed., 2006).
16. Although the term is somewhat indistinct, "mainline" is generally used to refer to Protestant
denominations whose "instincts lead [them] to seek common ground between what seem to be
irreconcilable concepts or ideas." William McKinney, Mainline Protestantism 2000, 558 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 57, 58 (1998). These instincts lead to tensions "between faithfulness to
Christian orthodoxy and accommodation to the new insights and possibilities of philosophy and
science" and, first and foremost, a disagreement with other Christian groups about "the degree to
which churches ought to accommodate to cultural changes." Id. at 59. The category of mainline
churches is generally thought to include Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, the
Reformed Church, Lutherans, Methodists, the Disciples of Christ, American Baptists, and several
other smaller groups. Id. at 58. Most if not all members of the National Council of Churches are
considered to be mainline denominations. 1d.
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Although the "presenting issue" in the current disputes generally has to do
with the sexuality of clergy or higher leaders, many argue that the disputes
stem from fundamental differences over biblical interpretation and the
authority of scripture.18  According to some estimates, the number of
congregations that have departed TEC in the wake of the Robinson
consecration is around 100,'9 and includes some of the denomination's
largest and most influential traditionalist parishes. 20  Disputes over
controversial actions at the most recent national gatherings of both
Episcopalians and Presbyterians have continued to draw additional scrutiny
from dissenting member congregations. 21 As the relationships break down
17. Apart from sporadic departures by individual churches (which usually can be traced to local
circumstances such as a deteriorating relationship with the regional governing body or even
personality conflicts), there have been several waves of departures from the mainline churches. The
most significant prior to the current conflict involved doctrinal developments leading to the
decisions of the PC(USA) and TEC to begin ordaining women. The PC(USA) was formed by a
1983 merger between the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS) and the United
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (UPCUSA). Lloyd J. Lunceford,
Considerations Specific to Presbyterians, in A GUIDE TO CHURCH PROPERTY LAW, supra note 15, at
65. The UPCUSA began ordaining women in 1956, while the PCUS followed suit in 1964.
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.), ORDINATION OF WOMEN IN THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH
(U.S.A.): A HERSTORY (2005), http://www.pcusa.org/women/ordination/ordinationbulletin.pdf. This
led to the formation of the traditionalist Presbyterian Church in America (PCA) in 1973.
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN AMERICA, A BRIEF HISTORY: PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN AMERICA,
http://www.pcanet.org/general/history.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) (describing the 1973 decision
of "some 260 congregations" from the PCUS to form the PCA). Although the number of departing
churches was large, the general church filed few civil actions seeking control over the properties,
probably due to the sheer amount of legal resources that prosecuting such actions would require.
John H. Adams, Separatist PCA and EPC Voted Against Property Trusts, THE LAYMAN ONLINE
(Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.layman.org/layman/news/2005-news/separatist-pca-and-epc.htm. In
TEC, the official decision to ordain women both as priests and as bishops came in 1976. THE
EPISCOPAL CHURCH, A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS CONCERNING WOMEN IN HOLY ORDERS,
http://www.episcopalchurch.org/41685_3276_ENGHTM.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). This
action led to the division at issue in Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Los Angeles v.
Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981). See infra notes 123-
32 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., John Yates & Os Guinness, Why We Left the Episcopal Church, WASH. POST, Jan.
8, 2007, at A I5 ("The American Episcopal Church no longer believes the historic, orthodox
Christian faith common to all believers.").
19. THE FALLS CHURCH & TRURO CHURCH, 40 DAYS OF DISCERNMENT 85 (2006),
http://www.40daysofdiscemment.org/resources/40daysGuidebook.pdf.
20. Bill Turque & Michelle Boorstein, 7 Va. Episcopal Parishes Vote to Sever Ties; Same-Sex
Unions, Choice of Gay Bishop Spark Conservatives' Break from Church, WASH. POST, Dec. 18,
2006, at AO1.
21. See, e.g., Rachel Zoll, Episcopalians Firm on Gay Bishops; Delegates Reject Anglicans'
Request for Temporary Ban, WASH. POST, June 21, 2006, at AI I ("Episcopal delegates snubbed
Anglican leaders' request that they temporarily stop electing openly gay bishops, a vote that
prompted the church's leader to call a special session in hopes of reaching a compromise to preserve
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and long-term attempts at reconciliation fail, the parties involved are more
frequently taking their disputes to the civil courts, where national churches
and their regional organizational bodies22 have sought to assert ownership of
the property. Although the majority of disaffiliating congregations have
been composed of traditionalists seeking to leave more progressive regional
authorities, conflicts occasionally occur in the opposite orientation:
progressive congregations in relatively traditionalist regions have voiced
concern that they may not be allowed to remain in the general church if the
entire regional structure chooses to disaffiliate.23
Courts adjudicating such disputes face a complex array of legal issues,
ranging from applying intricate state trust law provisions to determining
what relative weight to give often-contradictory documents.24 These tasks
are particularly difficult because the entities involved in church property
litigation tend to be very unlike their secular counterparts, and because
courts must always be wary of impermissibly involving themselves in
religious matters. 25  Given these considerations, courts, churches, and their
attorneys must be informed about the constitutional standards involved, the
ways in which states have adopted, adapted, and applied these standards, and
where this area of the law might be headed as America's mainline Protestant
denominations continue to struggle with competing visions of self-identity.
Accordingly, Part II of this Comment briefly reviews the history of civil
adjudication of church property disputes in America, focusing on the
challenges posed by forms of church polity such as those of mainline
Protestant denominations, as well as the jurisdictional limits established by
Anglican unity. The vote Tuesday by the Episcopal House of Deputies came just hours before
Presbyterians, at a separate meeting, approved a plan to let local congregations install gay ministers
if they wish.").
22. In Presbyterianism, these regional groups are known as presbyteries and synods, and have a
roughly representative form of governance. PC(USA) - Presbyteries, Synods and Other Links of
Interest, http://www.pcusa.org/links (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). The United Methodist Church
elects and appoints bishops, who each oversee one or more annual conferences. Structure &
Organization: Organization-UMC.org, http://www.umc.org/site/c.lwL4KnNILtH/b.1720697/
k.734E/Structure__OrganizationOrganization.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). In the Anglican
tradition, to which TEC belongs, the regional authorities are dioceses, and each is presided over by a
bishop and an executive board. See, e.g., EDOT-Executive Board, http://www.epicenter.org/
edot/Executive Board.aspSnlD=2 (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). These structural differences, which
are the result of extensive and weighty theological history, often have a significant impact on the
details of church property litigation; these differences will be noted here as far as it is relevant and
practicable, but the similarities between the three denominations and others like them, particularly
on the general level with which this article is concerned, are quite numerous. For a more detailed
discussion of denominational differences and their implications for church property disputes, see A
GUIDE TO CHURCH PROPERTY LAW, supra note 15, chs. 4-6.
23. See, e.g., Stipulation by Counsel, Calvary Episcopal Church v. Duncan, (Ct. Com. P1. of
Allegheny Cty., Pa., 2006), available at http://www.calvarypgh.org/Signed-Stipulation.pdf.
24. See generally Lloyd J. Lunceford, Introduction, in A GUIDE TO CHURCH PROPERTY LAW,
supra note 15, at iii-iv.
25. See id. at iii-vii.
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the Constitution. It then surveys extant scholarship on the relevant Supreme
Court decisions and categorizes the different approaches the states have
taken in implementing those decisions. Part III proceeds to an evaluation of
the various approaches to church property disputes, examining the asserted
need for a uniform standard as opposed to one that is more flexible and fact-
specific. After briefly weighing several inferior proposed solutions to the
current confusion, it commends a strict neutral-principles-of-law approach as
the interpretation that best comports with appropriate deference to precedent,
the interests and desires of the parties involved, and the fundamental
principles of American religious and civic practice. Part IV offers some
thoughts on the future direction of the law in church property disputes in
light of current events, focusing on several ongoing situations with national
implications, the possibility of further consideration by the U.S. Supreme
Court, and the potential impact of factors external to civil adjudication on
future jurisprudence in the area. Part V will briefly conclude the Comment.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND: WHATARE THE STANDARDS FOR CIVIL
COURT INVOLVEMENT IN INTRACHURCH DISPUTES?
A. Denominational Taxonomy
Much of the legal complexity created by disputes such as those
described above stems from the fact that the Supreme Court has identified
essentially two standards for describing the organization of religious bodies:
hierarchical and congregational.26 The hierarchical model is typified by the
Roman Catholic Church, and is characterized by the subjection of individual
congregations to the authority of ascending orders of governing bodies or
individuals. 27  Local bodies may enjoy some limited autonomy, but
governance is centralized, with clergy and staff paid by superior bodies and
title to local church property held by the same.28 Churches of this type
present relatively few problems in property disputes, because the general
church29 clearly maintains ownership of local property assets.3 ° In contrast,
26. Lloyd J. Lunceford, Federal Constitutional Principles, in A GUIDE TO CHURCH PROPERTY
LAW, supra note 15, at 28 n. 1. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 597-98 (1979).
27. Lunceford, supra note 26, at 28 n.l.
28. See id.
29. The terms "national church" and "general church" are used interchangeably throughout the
article, and both refer to the highest organizational authority in a denomination such as the PC(USA)
or TEC.
congregational churches such as those in the Baptist and Evangelical Free
traditions typically have no organizational structure connecting individual
congregations in a legal sense, although they may form loose partnerships
for shared purposes, such as supporting missionary work.3 For legal
purposes, such congregational churches are treated like other voluntary
associations, without regard to religious doctrine, which generally means
that disputes are resolved in favor of a majority of the local church group.32
Mainline Protestant denominations generally fall somewhere between
these two categories, defying easy classification and giving rise to thorny
issues for members and non-members alike.33 In these denominations,
"individual congregations are subject in varying degrees to the supervisory
jurisdiction of regional or national bodies-presbyteries, dioceses,
conferences, synods, General Conferences and General Assemblies.
3 4
Although some scholars have identified further distinctions among the
hierarchical and intermediate forms, such as "synodical," "presbyterian,"
and "episcopal"3 5 (with the lower-case initial letters indicating a manner of
governance rather than a particular denomination), the Supreme Court, as
noted above, has continued to implement the simpler distinction between
"hierarchical" and "congregational," and has generally placed mainline
30. See Lunceford, supra note 26, at 28 n.1.
31. See id.
32. See id.; see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 595 (1979).
33. Lunceford, supra note 26, at 28 n.l.
34. Id. Organizations which have broken away from historical mainline denominations, such as
the Presbyterian Church in America and the Convocation of Anglicans in North America, have
chosen to organize themselves along explicitly congregational lines with regard to property issues,
reflecting ongoing concern about the property implications of intermediate forms of governance.
See, e.g., THE BOOK OF CHURCH ORDER OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN AMERICA §§ 25-9 to -Il
(6th ed. 2007), available at http://www.pcaac.org/BCO%202007%20Combined%20for/o2OWeb.pdf
("All particular churches shall be entitled to hold, own and enjoy their own local properties, without
any right of reversion whatsoever to any Presbytery, General Assembly or any other courts hereafter
created, trustees or other officers of such courts .... While ... in matters ecclesiastical the actions
of such local congregation or church shall be in conformity with the provisions of this Book of
Church Order, nevertheless, in matters pertaining to [questions of affiliation and church property],
action may be taken by such local congregation or local church in accordance with the civil laws
applicable to such local congregation or local church .... The relationship is voluntary, based upon
mutual love and confidence, and is in no sense to be maintained by the exercise of any force or
coercion whatsoever. A particular church may withdraw from any court of this body at any time for
reasons which seem to it sufficient.") (emphases added); Convocation of Anglicans in North
America Frequently Asked Questions, Question 19, http://www.canaconvocation.org/index.php?
option=comscontent&task=view&id=30&Itemid=34#Ql9 (last visited Oct. 23, 2007) ("Each local
congregation will hold title to its own property. In CANA, there will be no 'Dennis Canon' (a
national canon purportedly passed in 1979 by which The Episcopal Church asserts an ownership
interest in the property of all constituent member dioceses and congregations, subject to state
law).").
35. Raymond J. Dague & R. Wicks Stephens II, Considerations Specific to Episcopalians, in A
GUIDE TO CHURCH PROPERTY LAW, supra note 15, at 124 (citing David B. Stevick, CANON LAW: A
HANDBOOK 71-86 (1965)).
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Protestant denominations in the former. Mixed categorizations are possible;
the Supreme Court has indirectly recognized at least one instance where a
non-mainline church was considered generally hierarchical, but
congregational as to property issues,3 6 and some scholars have argued that
TEC should be treated in the same manner.37 For the purposes of this
article, churches whose organizational structure falls somewhere between
the extremes of hierarchical and congregational will be referred to as "semi-
hierarchical."
B. Constitutional Background
Depending on the state in which a property dispute arises, the civil
court's categorization of any particular religious body can be profoundly
significant, if not determinative. However, before determining the
implications of the categorization, a brief examination of the constitutional
history of civil (as opposed to ecclesial) court resolution of church disputes
in America is necessary.
Of course, civil court resolution need not reach the question of
categorization, or any of the complex inquiries discussed below, when the
grantor has expressly created a trust assigning ownership of the property in
case of a dispute-a task that, depending on the circumstances, can be
somewhat akin to signing a prenuptial agreement (and just as distasteful
during periods of amicable relations).38 Under the law of trusts, formation
of an express trust requires "some judicially recognizable manifestation or
expression of intent by the grantor" to give the property to the trustee subject
to certain conditions (such as, for example, that the trustee congregation
remain a member of the general church), rather than as an unencumbered
gift.39 The problem, however, is that in many cases the intent of the grantor
is not clearly manifested or expressed, particularly when, in the case of
church property disputes, the grantor either did not foresee or preferred not
to plan for the possibility of schism.40 This, as well as the order in which the
36. H. Reese Hansen, Religious Organizations and the Law of Trusts, in RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 288 (James A. Serritella et al. eds., 2006) (discussing Md.
and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 241 A.2d 691, 700-
01 (Md. 1968), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 528 (1969), decree afd, 254 A.2d 162 (Md. 1969),
appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367, 367-68 (1970) (per curiam)).
37. See generally Dague & Stephens, supra note 35, at 133-34.
38. Hansen, supra note 36, at 283.
39. Id.
40. Id.
relevant constitutional doctrines and provisions were developed and enacted,
has led to many congregations and national churches finding themselves
without clear answers to the ownership question if and when disputes arise.
Turning to the constitutional rules governing the area, churches finding
themselves in the lamentable situation of a split can expect at least this under
modem First Amendment jurisprudence: the civil courts may not rule on
church property disputes if doing so requires them to intrude on matters of
doctrine or theology.4 I Doing so would constitute an impermissible
establishment of religion. 42 However, this has not always been recognized,
and to understand the thicket in which contemporary church property dispute
jurisprudence now finds itself, the path the courts have taken to get there
must be examined. Furthermore, although Establishment Clause violations
have indeed been the main concern throughout the development of the law
in this area, there has also been a more recent recognition that approaches
giving too much deference to one party to lessen Establishment Clause
concerns may run the risk of violating the other party's free exercise rights.43
1. Constitutional Standards-The English Rule
As in other areas of the law, early American courts were faced with the
decision of whether to continue the prior approach taken by English courts
when considering internal disputes of religious organizations. The "English
rule," espoused in Craigdallie v. Aikman, 44 is also known as the doctrine of
implied trust or the departure-from-doctrine rule.45 It called on courts, in the
absence of express language, to make an investigation into the doctrinal
beliefs of the disputing parties, and to imply a trust in favor of the party most
closely adhering to the beliefs held by the donor, effectively giving that
faction ownership.46
Although practicable in England at the time, the standard was rejected
by many American courts in cases through the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries as "an unacceptable intrusion by civil authority into ecclesiastical
41. See Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969) ("[T]he departure-from-doctrine element ... requires the civil
court to determine matters at the very core of a religion .... Plainly, the First Amendment forbids
civil courts from playing such a role.").
42. See id.
43. Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes among Religious
Organizations, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 36, at 317.
44. 4 Eng. Rep. 435 (1820) (resolving a property dispute between factions of a Scottish
congregation of 'Burgher Seceders' by holding that unless otherwise agreed, the faction espousing
the original founding principles of the group is entitled to the property).
45. See Hansen, supra note 36, at 286.
46. Id.
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affairs and . . . an impermissible state establishment of religion. 47
However, the American rejection of the English rule was not absolute: in the
first of three seminal Supreme Court cases on church property disputes,
Watson v. Jones,45 the Court was faced with a decision by a Kentucky
appellate court purporting to apply the English rule. The Supreme Court
declined to follow suit, instead utilizing the hierarchical-deference approach,
discussed below, without absolutely rejecting the English rule. 49 Eventually,
the Court revisited the subject and, in 1969, expressly found the English rule
approach to be unconstitutional 50 in American courts. 5'
2. Constitutional Standards-Hierarchical Deference
In addition to announcing its disfavor of the English rule, the Court in
deciding Watson elected to take what would become the second main
approach to resolving church property disputes: hierarchical deference,
under which courts give weight to the determination of the highest
denominational court or tribunal that has spoken on the matter.52 Watson
involved a dispute over the issue of slavery between competing factions of
the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Kentucky. 3 One
faction, strongly anti-slavery, garnered a majority of the church's
membership, but was at cross-purposes with the church's governing session,
47. Dague & Stephens, supra note 35, at 29; see also Hansen, supra note 36, at 286 (noting an
1846 Vermont case, Smith v. Nelson, in which the court declined to apply the English rule).
48. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
49. Id. at 725.
50. Several well-established procedural matters govern church property disputes. As Justice
Powell rightly noted in his dissent in Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court expressly recognized the
application of the First Amendment to the states through incorporation under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the principle that federal courts are to follow the substantive law of the states when
sitting in diversity (following Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) in the area of church
property disputes. 443 U.S. 595, 617 n.4 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[B]eginning with Kedroff
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, this Court has indicated repeatedly that the principles of general federal
law announced in Watson v. Jones are now regarded as rooted in the First Amendment, and are
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citations omitted).
51. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969), discussed further infra. Dean Hansen details an interesting proliferation
in state-court use of the English rule during the almost 100 years between the Supreme Court's
disapproval of it in Watson and total rejection of it in Hull. Hansen, supra note 36, at 287 & n.68
(noting "momentum favoring its adoption by other states" and listing supporting citations). Hansen
also points to "an excellent and lucid discussion [in Dallin H. Oaks, TRUST DOCTRINES IN CHURCH
CONTROVERSIES 42 (1984)] of the theoretical basis for the implied trust doctrine and its complete
unsuitability as an American legal device." Id. at 286 n. 53.
52. Lunceford, supra note 26, at 29.
53. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 681.
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which was under the control of the congregation's pro-slavery minority. 54
The position of the anti-slavery faction was supported by the Declaratory
Statements and Resolutions of the national church's General Assembly, the
highest judicatory of the denomination,55 but the intermediate bodies (the
Presbytery and Synod) both divided on the issue of slavery, with each side
professing to represent the true presbytery and the true synod, respectively,
until the General Assembly declared the anti-slavery bodies to be the rightful
ones. 56
For the Court, the organizational structure was the deciding factor. In
the words of the opinion, "the local congregation is itself but a member of a
much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its
government and control, and is bound by its orders and judgments. 57
Because of this, "the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and
as binding on them, in their application to the case before them. 5
8
Accordingly, the Court deferred to the General Assembly and determined
that the anti-slavery group was the "true church," and thus entitled to the
property. 59 This analysis avoided the establishment problems posed by the
English rule, and was also at least theoretically fair to all parties, as they
voluntarily either created or affiliated with the church structure. 60 For nearly
a century, the hierarchical-deference model was the preferred approach for
civil courts addressing church property disputes, and is still permissible and,
in fact, still in use in many states today.6'
3. Constitutional Standards-Neutral Principles of Law
Finally, after nearly a century of using the hierarchical-deference
approach of Watson, the Court turned its eye toward a new approach, one
based on "neutral principles of law" and thus offering an additional
permissible way to resolve church property disputes. 62  The neutral-
principles approach was first addressed by the Court in Presbyterian Church
in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church,63 a case involving two Savannah churches seeking to disaffiliate
54. Id. at 690-94.
55. Id. at 690-91.
56. Id. at 693.
57. Id. at 726-27.
58. Id. at 727.
59. Id. at 734-35.
60. Hansen, supra note 36, at 289. The hierarchical-deference approach is evaluated in further
detail infra at notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
61. See Appendix, infra.
62. See Gerstenblith, supra note 43, at 334.
63. 393 U.S. 440, 442 (1969). In addition to finalizing the demise of the English rule for
American courts, see supra note 51, the Court in Hull discussed the neutral-principles approach in
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from the Presbyterian Church in the United States ("PCUS"), citing a host of
doctrinal changes and actions the churches claimed were at odds with right
doctrine and practice. 64 The Supreme Court of Georgia had applied the
English rule, and the U.S. Supreme Court struck down that decision and
remanded the case for adjudication under either the Watson hierarchical-
deference approach, or one based on "neutral principles of law. 65
The Court then expressly adopted and fleshed out the application of this
standard in the landmark case of Jones v. Wolf 66  Jones essentially
this influential passage:
[Tihere are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which
can be applied without "establishing" churches to which property is awarded .... [T]he
[First] Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes
without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Hence, States,
religious organizations, and individuals must structure relationships involving church
property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.
Id. at 449. The actual concept of the neutral-principles approach is actually of a much older vintage,
as precursors and clearly discernable ancestors in lower court opinions predate the Supreme Court's
consideration by decades. One notable example appears in the 1903 opinion in Morris Street Baptist
Church v. Dart, in which the Supreme Court of South Carolina stated that
[w]hen a civil right depends upon an ecclesiastical matter, it is the civil court, and not the
ecclesiastical, which is to decide. But the civil tribunal tries the civil right, and no
more .... The civil courts will not enter into the consideration of church doctrine or
church discipline, nor will they inquire into the regularity of the proceedings of the
church judicatories having cognizance of such matters. To assume such jurisdiction
would not only be an attempt by the civil courts to deal with matters of which they have
no special knowledge, but it would be inconsistent with complete religious liberty,
untrammeled by state authority. On this principle, the action of church authorities in the
deposition of pastors and the expulsion of members is final. Where, however, a church
controversy necessarily involves rights growing out of a contract recognized by the civil
law, or the right to the possession of property, civil tribunals cannot avoid adjudicating
these rights, under the law of the land ....
45 S.E. 753, 754 (S.C. 1903).
64. Hull, 393 U.S. at 442. The Supreme Court of Georgia listed the objections as follows:
'[O]rdaining of women as ministers and ruling elders, making pronouncements and
recommendations concerning civil, economic, social and political matters, giving support
to the removal of Bible reading and prayers by children in the public schools, adopting
certain Sunday School literature and teaching neo-orthodoxy alien to the Confession of
Faith and Catechisms, as originally adopted by the general church, and causing all
members to remain in the National Council of Churches of Christ and willingly accepting
its leadership which advocated named practices, such as the subverting of parental
authority, civil disobedience and intermeddling in civil affairs'; also 'that the general
church has ... made pronouncements in matters involving international issues such as the
Vietnam conflict and has disseminated publications denying the Holy Trinity and
violating the moral and ethical standards of the faith.'
Id. at 442 n. I (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 449-52.
66. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). In the intervening years between Hull and Jones, the
Court decided a church property dispute case by employing the hierarchical-deference approach
presented the Supreme Court's evaluation of Georgia's response to the
Supreme Court's Hull decision a decade earlier.67 The case arose in the
wake of a vote by a majority of the Vineville Presbyterian Church in Macon
to disaffiliate from the PCUS, and a resulting determination by the PCUS
that those in the minority faction were the rightful owners. 68 Had the lower
courts applied the Watson hierarchical-deference approach, the PCUS
decision would have received the deference of the civil courts and the
property would have been awarded to the minority. 69 However, both the
trial court and the Supreme Court of Georgia applied the neutral-principles
doctrine developed by Georgia courts following Hull, and found for the
majority faction.7° The U.S. Supreme Court, after weighing the merits of
Georgia's new approach, concluded that it would satisfy the requirements of
the First Amendment and remanded for adjudication under that standard.7
This approach, in which the civil court resolves church property disputes
by examining any materials necessary, so long as its use of those materials
does not require it to decide issues of religious doctrine or practice, consists
of basically two steps. 7' First, the court must determine in which party title
to the property is vested.73  The court makes this determination by
examining the deeds to the property and the group's corporate charter,
paying special notice to any trust or condition in the general church's
favor. The court should also examine the constitution of the general
from Watson, illuminating the relationship of and differences between the hierarchical-deference and
neutral-principles approaches, particularly in light of the very mixed responses of state courts to the
Jones decision. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976). The seven-justice Milivojevich majority found that the dispute was primarily doctrinal and
thus deferred to the hierarchical authorities to avoid transgressing the First Amendment. Id. at 709.
The two dissenting justices insisted that neutral principles could be applied without raising First
Amendment concerns and would have led to the opposite result, Id. at 733-34 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
67. Indeed, the Court began by noting that "Georgia's approach to church property litigation has
evolved in response" to Hull. Jones, 443 U.S. at 599.
68. Id. at 598-99.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 599.
71. Id. at 604. The Court did note that, when applied to controversies between competing
factions of a local congregation, the neutral-principles-of-law approach requires that there be some
determination as to who is the "true representative" of the local church. Id. at 607. The Court
explained that this determination must be made on neutral, secular grounds as opposed to inquiring
into the decision of the religious hierarchy. Id. at 607-08. The Court suggested that the most likely
candidate for such a neutral determination was a rebuttable presumption of majority control, and
indeed, that was the test the respondents claimed was applied by the lower courts. Id. at 607.
However, the lower court decisions did not explicitly state this presumption, and thus the Supreme
Court was compelled to vacate and remand the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Id. at
609-10.
72. Id. at 603-04.
73. Id. at 604.
74. Id. at 606.
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church, searching for trusts in the general church's favor.7 5  The ultimate
goal of the civil court should be the enforcement of the parties' intent, if the
intent is manifested by the documents.7 6  The second step in the neutral-
principles approach applies if the court determines that title is vested in the
local congregation, and requires an investigation by the court to determine
who controls the local body.77 There is a presumption of majority control,
but the presumption is rebuttable if the documents examined in the first step,
or any others that are relevant and constitutionally permissible, so indicate. 8
Aside from the operation of the standard, perhaps the most important
element of the Jones Court's decision was its reiteration that the Constitution
neither mandates nor prohibits either the hierarchical-deference or neutral-
principles approach. 79  That being said, the five-justice majority in Jones
extolled at some length the benefits of the neutral-principles approach as
contrasted with hierarchical deference, giving an impression of strong
support for the former over the latter.8° (The Jones Court's rationale in
support of the neutral-principles approach will be discussed further below. 81)
It is clear that the standard adopted by each jurisdiction (as well as the





78. Id. at 607-08.
79. Id. at 602. The Jones Court quoted Justice Brennan's statement in an earlier case that "a
State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it
involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets
of faith." Id. (citing Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg,
Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam)). Interestingly, the Louisiana
Supreme Court found that, based on the First Amendment and the parallel provision in the Louisiana
state constitution, the adoption of the neutral-principles approach was actually required. Fluker
Cmty. Church v. Hitchens, 419 So. 2d 445, 447 (La. 1982) ("[W]e think the safeguards against laws
establishing religion and prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... necessitate our adoption of the
,neutral principles' approach. Whatever authority a hierarchical organization may have over
associated local churches is derived solely from the local church's consent. Refusal to adjudicate a
dispute over property rights or contractual obligations, even when no interpretation or evaluation of
ecclesiastical doctrine or practice is called for, but simply because the litigants are religious
organizations, may deny a local church recourse to an impartial body to resolve a just claim, thereby
violating its members' rights under the free exercise provision, and also constituting a judicial
establishment of the hierarchy's religion.").
80. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-06.
81. See infra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
82. This flexibility for state courts has led one commentator to describe, in more than mild
understatement, the states' reactions to Jones as having "considerable diversity." Hansen, supra
note 36, at 290. This diversity is discussed in greater detail infra notes 96-137 and accompanying
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C. Denominational Reaction to Jones v. Wolf
The Court's decision in Jones had a rapid impact on America's most
prominent mainline denominations, none of whose constitutions contained
specific property trust clauses at the time of the decision.8 3 Seizing on the
language of the Jones Court, which stated that "the constitution of the
general church can be made to recite an express trust in favor of the
denominational church . . . . And the civil courts will be bound to give
effect to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in some
legally cognizable form,"8 4  several national churches amended their
constitutions to add provisions stating that local bodies hold their property in
trust for the use and benefit of the general church.85 The legal effect of such
clauses is hotly debated.86
The Jones decision was handed down just three months prior to The
Episcopal Church's triennial national General Convention, at which the
church was faced with an increasing number of parishes departing in
response to significant doctrinal disagreements. 87  In response to both the
departures and the Jones decision, the Church's House of Bishops adopted
what has come to be known as the "Dennis Canon," stating that "[a]ll real
and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission or
Congregation is held in trust for this Church and the Diocese thereof in
which such Parish, Mission or Congregation is located., 88 Following this
adoption, several regional dioceses adopted their own versions of the Dennis
Canon.89 In litigation, representatives of the general church have stated that
the trust clauses "merely codify[] a longstanding understanding of the right
text, and presented on a state-by-state basis in the Appendix, infra.
83. Lunceford, supra note 26, at 33-34.
84. Jones, 443 U.S. at 606. In context, the quoted statement reads as follows:
At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so desire, that the
faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property. They can modify
the deeds or the corporate charter to include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the
general church. Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to
recite an express trust in favor of the denominational church. The burden involved in
taking such steps will be minimal. And the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the
result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form.
Id.
85. Lunceford, supra note 17, at 68; Dague & Stephens, supra note 35, at 129.
86. See, e.g., infra note 90 and accompanying text; infra notes 217-220 and accompanying text.
87. Daguc & Stephens, supra note 35, at 129.
88. Jd. at 129-30 (citing Journal of the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church
of the United States of America otherwise known as the Episcopal Church (1979), p. AA-282).
There is some question, based on the documentation, as to whether the Dennis Canon was validly
adopted by TEC. For an inquiry into this question, see id. at 130-31.
89. Id. at 134. An additional provision of the national Dennis Canon makes it clear that "[tihe
several Dioceses may, at their election, further confirm the trust declared [above] by appropriate
action, but no such action shall be necessary for the existence and validity of the trust." Id. at 130.
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of the diocese to parish property upon a parish seeking to leave the
denomination," but at least some commentators vigorously deny this is the
case.
90
The Presbyterian response (or more accurately, responses) to Jones is
considerably more complex, primarily because the ruling preceded by only a
few years the historic merger between the northern (UPCUSA) and southern
(PCUS) Presbyterian churches. 9' Neither church's constitution historically
had contained a trust provision akin to the Episcopal Dennis Canon. 92 The
merger agreement, which resulted in the formation of the PC(USA),
contained express guarantees that individual local churches could, by vote of
the congregation, exempt themselves from the property provisions of the
new PC(USA) constitution that were dissimilar from those contained in the
prior denomination's constitution, and instead choose to be bound by the
previous terms.93 The PC(USA) constitution contained a trust clause from
the date of the merger in 1983, but both the UPCUSA and the PCUS also
amended their constitutions just prior to the merger to include trust
clauses. 94 The end result was that after 1983, all Presbyterian congregations
in the PC(USA) were at least subject to the language of a general-church
trust clause, although it is very likely that this was not universally known. 95
Therefore, both of the major mainline Episcopalian and Presbyterian
denominations claim the benefit of a trust provision.
D. State Reaction to Jones v. Wolf
These general principles and provisions---denominational structure, the
three constitutional standards for resolving church property disputes, and
denominational adoption of trust clauses-constitute the background
material for state courts addressing church property disputes since Jones.
The states have had to respond to the choice laid out by the Supreme Court:
whether to continue using the Watson deference approach, or to adopt the
neutral-principles-of-law method commended by the Jones majority. Of
course, deciding which constitutional approach to take is only the first step
in resolving such disputes, as the constitutional standards only dictate what
sources a court may consider. If the court adopts the less restrictive neutral-
90. Id. at 134-35.
91. See supra note 17.
92. Lunceford, supra note 17, at 68.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 68-69.
95. Id.
principles approach, it may be called upon to analyze claims based on the
laws of real property, trusts, charitable organizations, state statutes, or, less
frequently, other areas.
Most discussions of the constitutional standards include a section in
which the commentator attempts to reduce the pluriform responses of the
several states into neat categories.96 Some such groupings take state courts
at their word97 (i.e., when a state supreme court explicitly adopts or declines
to adopt the neutral-principles approach, the state is placed analytically in
the appropriate category, either "neutral-principles" or "hierarchical-
deference," without further investigation into the way the test was and has
been applied); however, this manner of labeling fails to take into account the
widely divergent ways in which the standards, particularly neutral-
principles, are applied. Even analyses that have noted and decried the
inconsistencies among the states in applying the standards have often merely
pointed out the results and the fact that different state courts have reached
conflicting outcomes on substantially similar facts, rather than attempting to
discern patterns of interpretation in the court opinions.
98
Perhaps the most accurate and helpful construct for classifying state
court responses to Jones is an approach, agreed upon by Dean Hansen and
Professor Gerstenblith, that identifies three major interpretational lines
courts take in applying the acceptable constitutional standards: strict
hierarchical deference, strict neutral principles, and a hybrid category under
which the court purports to adopt the neutral-principles approach, but then
essentially engages in hierarchical deference to some degree.9 9 Although
there are some state courts whose modem opinions fit neatly into one of the
three categories, others draw on elements of more than one. Arranging the
96. An exhaustive state-by-state analysis of state court reaction to Jones v. Wolf is beyond the
scope of this article; indeed, all commentators writing in the area are careful to stress that
practitioners should rely on academic writing only to understand the issues at play and the basic
framework of the analysis, and perhaps to get a sense of where their jurisdiction likely falls along the
spectrum. See, e.g., Lunceford, supra note 24, at iv-v. Thorough research into the relevant decisions
of the highest court of the local jurisdiction, if any, is absolutely necessary to ascertain which
approach the jurisdiction follows and how that approach may be applied in any particular case. Id.
With that rather extensive caveat, the author has endeavored to assemble an accurate categorization
for reference purposes of each jurisdiction's general approach to property issues, including the most
important decisions of each on the subject of church property disputes as of this writing. This
compendium may be found in the Appendix, infra.
97. See, e.g., Bishop and Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 96 n.10 (Colo. 1986); William
G. Ross, The Need for an Exclusive and Uniform Application of 'Neutral Principles' in the
Adjudication of Church Property Disputes, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 263, 280-81 nn.1 11-14 (1987).
98. See, e.g., Ashley Alderman, Note, Where's the Wall?: Church Property Disputes Within the
Civil Courts and the Need for Consistent Application of the Law, 39 GA. L. REV. 1027, 1039-51
(2005); Natalie L. Yaw, Note, Cross Fire: Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes After
Rasmussen v. Bunyan, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 813, 824-29 (2006).
99. Hansen, supra note 36, at 291; Gerstenblith, supra note 43, at 321-23.
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cases along interpretational lines allows for some overlap, at least in
analysis. 100
I. Interpretational Categories-Strict Hierarchical Deference
The first interpretational category, strict hierarchical deference, consists
of states that have considered Jones and its neutral-principles approach, but
have elected to continue the Watson hierarchical-deference model, based on
their conception of what comports most closely with the First Amendment,
their own precedent in similar cases, or other factors such as state statutes. o'
This category is fairly straightforward, as there is little variation in the way
100. For more comprehensive and detailed examinations of the myriad different ways in which
the interpretational approaches discussed in this section may be applied, see Hansen, supra note 36,
at 290-300; Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious
Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 513, 521-50 (1990).
101. Hansen, supra note 36, at 291. According to Dean Hansen, this category includes "at least
seven states," including Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, West Virginia, Michigan, and Texas. Id. at
291-92 and 292 n.1 15. However, it appears that this is at least arguable in several cases, on several
different grounds.
First, the state cases cited in support of this proposition include both state supreme court and
state appellate court decisions-in the latter category, the most notable are decisions from Michigan
and Texas. Id. at 292 n. 115. Although it is a fair assumption that a state supreme court's refusal to
overturn the decision of a lower court employing one constitutional standard or the other indicates
support for or at least satisfaction with that reasoning, the fact remains that the highest court in the
jurisdiction has not expressly and directly responded to the question posed to the states by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Jones: will you retain the hierarchical-deference approach, or will you adopt the
neutral-principles-of-law approach? This factor is one of the elements taken into consideration in
the compendium accompanying this article. See Appendix, infra.
Second, it is possible that the most recent decisions in several "strict-hierarchical-deference"
states actually misread precedent case law, which actually calls for the application of a different
standard. In Michigan, for example, the local churches in the two most important recent cases
argued unsuccessfully that the respective national churches, though hierarchical in some respects,
were congregational with respect to property. See Bennison v. Sharp, 329 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1982); Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of Lake Huron of the United
Presbyterian Church in the U.S., 384 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). Although the local
churches did not specifically reference them, the early Michigan Supreme Court cases of Bear v.
Heasley, 57 N.W. 270 (Mich. 1893), and Borgman v. Bultema, 182 N.W. 91 (Mich. 1921), could at
least arguably support the conclusion that churches need not be deemed hierarchical for all intents
and purposes. Another example is Texas, where some commentators have argued that appellate
courts applying the seminal decision of Brown v. Clark, 116 S.W. 360 (Tex. 1909), have "confused
the Texas Supreme Court's treatment of threshold subject matter jurisdiction (absent in matters
inherently religious in nature) with its treatment of the method civil courts are to apply when subject
matter jurisdiction is exercised," and as a consequence, that the actual standard in Texas, at least for
church property cases, is some variant of neutral principles. Lloyd J. Lunceford, Sample Case Law
from Selected State Courts, in A GUIDE TO CHURCH PROPERTY LAW, supra note 15, at 55-62; see
also Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-0838, 2007 WL 1861168, at *7-8 (Tex. Jun. 29, 2007)
(recognizing the neutral-principles approach articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, but declining to
apply it in a case dealing with a dispute over church discipline as opposed to church property).
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courts apply the constitutional hierarchical-deference standard. Courts in
this category first determine whether the church structure at issue is
hierarchical;10 2 if it is, the court asks whether the local church or its
leadership is under the control of the hierarchy. If so, the court then defers
to the determination of the hierarchy, either on the ground that it is a
religious question into which civil courts are barred from inquiring,1 °3 or on
the basis that it is a secular dispute, but one in which deference is required
due to the hierarchical and religious nature of the parties."0 The essential
point is that under the hierarchical-deference approach, "the decision of the
hierarchy will invariably be deferred to," and thus no secular areas of law
have any direct application whatsoever. 105
The strict-hierarchical-deference approach has been officially adopted
by the highest courts of four or possibly five states, and is followed without
state supreme court adoption in two or three other states. 106
A good example of this approach is the final decision in Mills v.
Baldwin.'07 Mills, a Florida case, involved a Presbyterian congregation in
which a majority voted to separate from the PCUS. 108 The trial court, which
applied (inappropriately, in the Supreme Court of Florida's view) the
neutral-principles-of-law approach, found that the majority owned the
property and could depart with it.'°9 A majority of the Supreme Court of
Florida held otherwise, rejecting the trial court's neutral-principles analysis
and finding that the hierarchical nature of the church meant that the
denomination's determination of which rival local group represented the
"true church" was entitled to deference. 10 Because the hierarchical church
102. See, e.g., Bennison, 329 N.W.2d at 472; Org. for Preserving the Constitution of Zion
Lutheran Church of Auburn v. Mason, 743 P.2d 848, 851 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); Church of God of
Madison v. Noel, 318 S.E.2d 920, 923 (W. Va. 1984).
103. Townsend v. Teagle, 467 So. 2d 772, 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mills v. Baldwin, 362
So. 2d 2, 6-7 (Fla. 1978), vacated and remanded, 443 U.S. 914, reinstated, 377 So. 2d 971 (Fla.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Nev.,
610 P.2d 182, 184 (Nev. 1980); Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of N.J. v. Graves, 417
A.2d 19, 24 (N.J. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Moore v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese
of N.J., 449 U.S. 1131 (1981); Diocese of Newark v. Bums, 417 A.2d 31, 34 (N.J. 1980); Noel, 318
S.E.2d at 923-24.
104. See, e.g., Calvary Presbyterian Church, 384 N.W.2d at 93; Protestant Episcopal Church in
the Diocese of N.J. v. Graves, 391 A.2d 563, 567 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978), affid, 401 A.2d
548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (per curiam), aff'd, 417 A.2d 19 (N.J. 1980), cert. denied sub
nom. Moore v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of N.J., 449 U.S. 1131 (1981).
105. Hansen, supra note 36, at 293.
106. See Appendix, infra.
107. 362 So. 2d at 6-7.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 7. ("[A] careful reading of the cases makes clear that the issue in a case such as this is
not who owns the property. The Madison Presbyterian Church of Madison, Florida, owns the
property. The true issue is-who represents the Madison Presbyterian Church? The authorities
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recognized the minority, the Supreme Court of Florida overruled the trial
court. , 
2. Interpretational Categories-Strict Neutral Principles of Law
Conversely, some states reject the Watson hierarchical-deference
approach and strictly apply the neutral-principles-of-law standard described
in Hull and adopted in Jones. " 2 Rather than beginning with an analysis of
the church structure and organization, these courts first undertake an
examination of who has legal title to the property. This inquiry generally
begins by looking at the deed to ascertain the identity of the express grantee,
and then looking for any restrictions on that party's ownership, such as
express trusts, reverter clauses, or conditions. "3 Courts taking this approach
require a clear showing of intent to create a trust before concluding a trust
has been created, which generally rules out implied trusts. 114 After making a
determination as to the titleholder's identity, the court may decide who
controls that entity. The titleholder is usually "an incorporated religious or
not-for-profit corporation and thus is governed by its articles of
incorporation and bylaws and by state statutes."' 1 5  Courts following the
from Watson v. Jones forward clearly respond that petitioners represent that church because of the
structure and government of PCUS.").
11. Id.
112. See, e.g., Trinity Presbyterian Church of Montgomery v. Tankersley, 374 So. 2d 861 (Ala.
1979); Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of L.A. v. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Ct. App.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); First Evangelical Methodist Church of Lafayette v.
Clinton, 360 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1987); York v. First Presbyterian Church of Anna, 474 N.E.2d 716 (I11.
App. Ct. 1984); Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S. for the Diocese of Lexington,
759 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1988); Fluker Cmty. Church v. Hitchens, 419 So. 2d 445 (La. 1982); Piletich
v. Deretich, 328 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 1982); Presbytery of Elijah Parish Lovejoy v. Jaeggi, 682
S.W.2d 465 (Mo. 1984) (en bane); First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. Presbyterian Church
in the U.S., 464 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1984); Christensen v. Roumfort, 485 N.E.2d 270 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984); Presbytery of Beaver-Butler of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Middlesex
Presbyterian Church, 489 A.2d 1317 (Pa. 1985); Presbytery of Donegal v. Calhoun, 513 A.2d 531
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986); Presbytery of Donegal v. Wheatley, 513 A.2d 538 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986);
Mikilak v. Orthodox Church in Am., 513 A.2d 541 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 528
A.2d 958 (Pa. 1987); Bd. of Bishops of the Church of the Living God v. Milner, 513 A.2d 1131 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986); Foss v. Dykstra, 319 N.W.2d 499 (S.D. 1982), affdon reh'g, 342 N.W.2d 220
(S.D. 1983).
113. See, e.g., First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady, 464 N.E.2d at 461.
114. See, e.g., id. at 462; Christensen, 485 N.E.2d at 270; Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 489
A.2d at 1324; Mikilak, 513 A.2d at 541.
115. Hansen, supra note 36, at 294. Apart from a few representative examples, the corpus and
complexities of state law that apply in strict-neutral-principles jurisdictions are not addressed here,
but can have a profound impact on the eventual decision reached by the court. See, e.g., In re
Episcopal Church Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 878-85 (Ct. App. 2007) (discussing in detail sections
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strict neutral-principles approach generally adopt the rebuttable presumption
from Jones that a majority of a congregation controls the congregation.
1 16
Because of this, courts utilizing this approach sometimes find in favor of the
local congregation (in the case of a break between the local and general
church) or the majority of a divided congregation which seeks to leave the
denomination.1 7  This stands in contrast with the usually outcome-
determinative hierarchical-deference approach, in which the general church
prevails in all but the rarest of circumstances. " 8 Of course, if the documents
indicate that a local church in fact intended to make itself and its property
subject to the control of the national church, a court may find for the latter
even when taking a strict neutral-principles approach.11 9 In one case, for
example, a court in Louisiana (which mandates the neutral-principles
approach 120) found "mention of the general denomination in church
documents sufficient to indicate an intention by the local congregation to be
subject to hierarchical control." 12'
of the California Corporations Code and breaking sharply with another appellate district's
interpretation of same), review granted, (Sept. 12, 2007).
116. See. e.g., Piletich, 328 N.W.2d at 702 (presumption of majority rule).
117. Hansen, supra note 36, at 294.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 298 ("As evidence of [intent to create a trust benefiting the national church], the court
relies on references to the denomination or beliefs in the deeds or in the charter, bylaws, or articles
of incorporation of the local church; on state incorporation statutes that require affiliation with the
denomination; or on provisions in the constitution or charter of the hierarchical church."). Although
Dean Hansen cites this rationale as an example of a hybrid approach combining neutral principles
and deference, it also seems possible that it could be merely a straightforward application of the
strict-neutral-principles approach, if the court finds that the references sufficiently evidence express
intent to create a trust in favor of the general church.
120. See supra note 79.
121. Hansen, supra note 36, at 298; see, e.g., Fluker Cmty. Church v. Hitchens, 419 So. 2d 445,
448 (La. 1982) ("The act of sale recites that the tract was sold by Fluker Farms, Inc. to 'Fluker
Chapel A.M.E. Church, Fluker, Louisiana.' . . . Consequently, Fluker acted solely within its capacity
as an A.M.E. local church in acquiring [the tract]."). Fluker was a 1981 controversy involving
Fluker Community Church, a congregation that voted to separate from the African Methodist
Episcopal (A.M.E.) church after nearly 100 years in the denomination when the general church
declined to redirect funds from foreign missions to make physical repairs requested by the local
congregation. Id. at 446. The local congregation brought an action to prevent the general church
from building a new building on another part of the property, and while the lower courts split on the
outcome, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the reasoning of both incorrect. Id. The court
expressed its commitment to the neutral-principles-of-law standard from Jones, but also stated that
"[w]hatever authority a hierarchical organization may have over associated local churches is derived
solely from the local church's consent." Id. at 447. After examining each party's documents,
including particularly the act of sale which specified the purchaser as an A.M.E. church, the court
found that "it was the intention of the parties, agreed upon before the dispute arose, that [the
property] may not be alienated without A.M.E.'s consent, and will be considered abandoned to
A.M.E. upon Fluker's disbanding as an A.M.E. society," and dismissed the local congregation's
claim. Id. at 448.
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The highest courts of at least nine states have adopted the strict-neutral-
principles standard as governing their jurisdictions, while lower courts in
several other jurisdictions have applied the approach. 2
A clear example of the strict-neutral-principles approach is Protestant
Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Los Angeles v. Barker, a California
appellate-level decision from 1981.23 The dispute in Barker arose when
four Episcopal parishes, objecting to that denomination's decisions to begin
ordaining women and doctrinal issues regarding the interpretation of the
Nicene Creed, severed ties with the national church and the Diocese but
retained their property. 12 4  The Diocese and general church sued, alleging
that the parishes' claim to the properties was erroneous, based on the
hierarchical-deference approach. 125  The trial court, ruling before the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Jones, applied the hierarchical-deference
standard and agreed, finding for the plaintiffs. 12 6 The appellate court noted
both the intervening Jones decision and a 1979 California Court of Appeal
case applying the neutral-principles standard based on the U.S. Supreme
Court's Hull opinion, 127 which it read in tandem as definitively establishing
the neutral-principles approach as the proper course for California courts to
follow. 128 The court then proceeded to apply the neutral-principles-of-law
122. See Appendix, infra.
123. 171 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981). The strict-neutral-
principles approach was applied (at least in name) by California courts from the time of Barker until
the summer of 2007, when a three-judge panel of the 4th Appellate District issued its opinion in In
re Episcopal Church Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 848 (Ct. App. 2007), review granted, (Sept. 12,
2007). Throughout that time and as of this writing, the California Supreme Court has not spoken on
the matter and what had been considerable tension among the appellate districts over whether the
neutral principles standard should be applied strictly or in a more deferential manner has now
become express and outright conflict. Compare Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 549, with Metropolitan
Philip v. Steiger, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 605, 609 n.7 (Ct. App. 2000). See also infra notes 179-201 and
accompanying text.
124. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Presbytery of Riverside v. Cmty. Church of Palm Springs, 152 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App.
1979).
128. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 549. Specifically, the Barker court stated:
[W]e conclude that California has adopted neutral principles of law as the basis for
resolution of church disputes; that use of the hierarchical theory is restricted to doctrinal
and ecclesiastical controversies and does not extend to property disputes; that property
disputes between ecclesiastical claimants, like property disputes between temporal
claimants, must be resolved by neutral principles of law. We, therefore, reject and
disapprove the reliance placed by the trial court on hierarchical theory as a means of
adjudicating this cause.
Id. Again, this conclusion has been strongly criticized by the most recent relevant California
approach strictly, by examining the local congregations' title deeds and
articles of incorporation, the constitution and canons of the general church,
and California state corporations statutes in search of an express trust in
favor of the Diocese or the general church. 29  The court drew on several
analogies to secular organizations, 30 and eventually found that for three of
the churches, no express or implied trust was created in favor of the Diocese
or the general church, and therefore those three local congregations owned
decision. See In re Episcopal Church Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845 passim, review granted, (Sept. 12,
2007).
129. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 553-55.
130. Two particular sections discussing the national church's assertion of a trust over the property
at issue are worth quoting at length, primarily for their likening of the religious bodies at issue here
to secular organizations. The first is found in the court's discussion of its general approach to
nationally affiliated local groups:
Under neutral principles of law if a local body affiliated with a national body holds
title to property in its own name and later secedes, the national body has little basis to
claim that such property is held in trust for it. If a local organization secedes from one
national entity and affiliates with another, absent other factors no claim can be laid to
property owned by and held in the name of the local organization. If a Kentucky Fried
Chicken franchisee secedes from its national affiliation to join a Tennessee Fried
Chicken operation, neutral principles of law do not recognize any claim by the ex-
franchisor against its departing franchisee's real property. In such instances valid claims
may exist for breach of contract, abuse of name, false pretenses, and the like, but
ordinarily no express trust arises against the property of the local organization. Under
neutral principles of law the same is true of a local church organization which changes
affiliation from one general church to another.
We find nothing in the title deeds of the church properties to create an express trust
in favor of the general church organizations.
Id. at 553-54 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In discussing the parishes' articles of
incorporation, the court observed:
[E]ach of the articles of these three churches declares in substance that the constitution,
canons, and discipline of PECUSA and the Diocese shall always form part of the articles
of incorporation and prevail against anything repugnant. Such declarations are a far cry
from an express trust in church property for the benefit of the Diocese and PECUSA.
Nor, did either the Diocese or PECUSA, on the various dates of these incorporations,
have any existing provisions in its rules for disposition of local church property on
dissolution or disaffiliation of a local church. [The general church and the Diocese]
interpret these general provisions in the articles of incorporation as a kind of open-ended
agreement by the local churches to accept in advance any and all rules and regulations
which might thereafter be put in effect by the general church. We do not believe such an
interpretation accords with real property law, with contract law, with corporate law, or
with trust law. Such declarations of affiliation and loyalty are nothing more than
expressions of present intention. We think such declarations no more restrictive offuture
amendments to the articles of incorporation than would be similar statements in an
automobile dealer's articles that it would always distribute General Motors products and
always be bound by General Motors rules and policies, or statements in a political club's
articles that it would forever support the Democratic Party and be forever bound by the
latter's rules and platform. A subsequent switch of affiliation by the dealer to Ford, or by
the political club to the Republican Party, would, under neutral principles of law, furnish
no basis for a claim of express trust by the superseded automobile manufacturer to
possession of the dealer's showroom and repair shop or a claim by the deserted political
party to possession of the political club's meeting premises and bank account.
Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
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the property.' 31  Under a strict-neutral-principles analysis, however, the
documents of the fourth church, which was established some nineteen years
later than the next most recent, were shown to include an express trust in
favor of the Diocese, and thus the church's actions made the Diocese the
proper owner under state corporations laws. '
3. Interpretational Categories-Hybrid of Deference and Neutral
Principles of Law
The third interpretational approach taken by some states in response to
Jones consists of what is at least putatively a combination of the two other
approaches. Generally, this takes the form of an express adoption of the
Jones neutral-principles standard, 3 3 followed by the application of a more
deferential approach than strict-neutral-principles. 134  Although there is a
wide variety in exactly how much deference courts using the hybrid
approach afford and the legal rationales they use in explaining their choices,
there are generally two related but distinct categories of reasoning: finding
that the local congregation intended to create an "implied" trust135 in favor
131. Id. at 555-56.
132. Id. ("[Church of the Holy Apostles] is specifically identified as a subordinate body of a
national body subject to the provisions of Corporations Code sections 9203 and 9802. It was
incorporated subsequent to the adoption of Diocesan Canon 10.06 in 1958, which declares that on
dissolution of a church its property shall revert to the Diocese. Its articles contain a specific
provision declaring that on liquidation, dissolution, or abandonment of the corporation its property
will inure to the benefit of a charitable fund organized and operated for religious or charitable
purposes by the Diocese. We conclude that under neutral principles of law the property of Holy
Apostles was subject to an express trust in favor of the Diocese .... ).
133. See, e.g., Bishop and Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 668 P.2d 948, 952-53 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983),
rev 'd, 716 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1986); N.Y. Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church v. Fisher, 438
A.2d 62, 68 (Conn. 1980); Hinkle Creek Friends Church v. W. Yearly Meeting of Friends Church,
469 N.E.2d 40, 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Emberry Cmty. Church v. Bloomington Dist. Missionary
and Church Extension Soc'y, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 288, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Fonken v. Cmty.
Church of Kamrar, 339 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa 1983); Fluker Cmty. Church v. Hitchens, 405 So. 2d
1223, 1225 (La. Ct. App. 1981), vacated and dismissed on other grounds, 419 So. 2d 445 (La.
1982); Presbytery of Bait. of the United Presbyterian Church v. Babcock Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 449 A.2d 1190, 1192 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982), affd, 464 A.2d 1008 (Md. 1983); Green v.
Lewis, 272 S.E.2d 181, 184 (Va. 1980).
134. See, e.g., Hinkle Creek Friends Church, 469 N.E.2d at 44-45; Fluker Cmty. Church, 419 So.
2d at 448; Babcock Mem 'l Presbyterian Church, 449 A.2d at 1194-95.
135. Many church property cases involve detailed trust law analyses. For the purposes of
understanding the way courts look at and speak about trusts in the church property context, it is
helpful to consider several excerpts from an essay on the subject by Professor Gerstenblith. "Trusts
come in several varieties: express trusts, either private or charitable, and implied trusts, either
resulting or constructive." Gerstenblith, supra note 43, at 329 (footnote omitted). In regard to
of the national church, and finding that the local church consented to be
bound by the rules of the general church. 1
3 6
Although the diversity of ways in which the hybrid approach has been
applied makes it difficult to speak with absolute confidence about state court
adoption, it is safe to say that at least eight states have officially adopted
some version of the hybrid approach. 1
3 7
Some courts utilizing the hybrid approach have made a determination
that a trust was intended by looking only to the documents of general
churches 13 8-although some commentators have noted that looking to
national church documents to ascertain the intent of the local congregation is
express trusts, Gerstenblith notes:
An express trust is defined as a fiduciary relationship with respect to property
"which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it" and which subjects
the legal titleholder to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another
person ....
Courts often fail to distinguish between property donated by an individual, who is
then the settlor of the trust, and property purchased by a local church with funds raised
exclusively from within its membership. Property donated by an individual to a religious
organization is generally held by the latter as a charitable trust, and the donor may impose
various restrictions on use of the property, designate the beneficiaries, and provide for the
trust's termination. In the case of donated property, the court must determine the
intended beneficiaries if the settlor has failed to do so clearly. If the titleholder simply
purchased the property, however, then there is no reason to presume that the form of
property ownership is that of a trust, unless the titleholder is not empowered by state law
to hold real property. Accordingly if the donor fails to express a restriction or if the local
church simply purchases property and takes title in its own name, then there is no
expression ... of intent as required under trust law from which to imply the existence of
a trust.
Id. at 330-31 (footnotes omitted). Gerstenblith then addresses both kinds of implied trusts:
The first type of implied trust, the resulting trust, arises when circumstances
indicate that the settlor did not intend the titleholder to take the entire interest in the
property .... Unlike a resulting or express trust, a constructive trust arises contrary to
the intent of the settlor. Courts impose constructive trusts in exercise of their equity
jurisdiction as a remedy for unjust enrichment.
Courts that consider the imposition of an implied trust in the context of church
property disputes agree that neither the resulting trust nor the constructive trust is an
appropriate remedy. Nevertheless, in the absence of written language creating an express
trust, these courts have used the term "implied trust" without attempting to define it.
Only one court has attempted to devise a term for a trust that neither fits into one of the
categories of implied trusts nor contains specific language in its documents creating an
express trust. In Bishop & Diocese of Colorado v. Mote, the Colorado Supreme Court
used the term "implied express trust" to describe an express trust that was not created by
actual language but instead was implied by the conduct of the parties and by the
circumstances surrounding donation of the gift.
Id. at 331-33 (emphases added) (footnotes omitted). The end result is that when they contemplate
trusts in the church property setting, courts are referring to either express trusts or the kind of
"implied express trust" discussed by the Colorado Supreme Court.
136. Hansen, supra note 36, at 297-99.
137. See Appendix, infra.
138. See African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in Am., Inc. v. Zion Hill Methodist Church,
Inc., 534 So. 2d 224 (Ala. 1988).
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somewhat unusual13 9-as well as to the local church's organization under
state laws requiring denominational affiliation.140  Another common
approach is for the court to find that a history of subordination to the
authority of the general church evinces an intent to be bound by that
authority in property matters. '
4
'
Other courts frame their deference within the context of neutral
principles in terms of the consent of the local congregation to the control of
the national church. 14' A finding of consent often takes the form of a
determination that something in the documents examined by the court has
the effect of rebutting the presumption of majority control of the local
congregation outlined in Jones. 143  Although the outcome is often precisely
the same as in a strict-hierarchical-deference jurisdiction, the path traveled in
arriving there is markedly different: under hierarchical deference, the court
defers based on its determination of the organizational structure of the
church, while under the consent-based hybrid model, the court defers based
139. Hansen, supra note 36, at 298 n.163 ("It is unclear how the court can use national church
documents as evidence of intention by the local congregation to create a trust since trust intent must
be found in the grantor. In these instances the national church, which is the beneficiary or grantee,
evidences the intent to create the trust. The language in the documents is probably viewed as a legal
limitation on the holding of property by the local church rather than as a trust.").
140. The fourth church in the Barker case is an excellent example of this version of the intent
branch of the hybrid approach. That congregation, unlike the other three, was incorporated
subsequent to the state's adoption of such a statute, and accordingly was found to have evinced an
intent to be bound by the national church's trust provision. See supra note 132 and accompanying
text.
141. See Green v. Lewis, 272 S.E.2d 181, 186 (Va. 1980) (finding that "from the language of the
deed involved, the Discipline of the A.M.E. Zion Church, and the relationship which has existed
between the central church and the congregation over a long period of years, that the A.M.E. Zion
Church does have a proprietary interest in the property of Lee Chapel, and that its interest in the
church property cannot be eliminated by the unilateral action of the congregation.").
142. See, e.g., Ohio Se. Conference of Evangelical United Brethren Church v. Kruger, 243 N.E.2d
781, 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 1968) ("For many years the membership of the Mills Church consented and
submitted to the control of a superior general church organization . . . . We find that the EUB
Church is a connectional church and Mills Memorial EUB Church is a subordinate member of this
larger religious organization and under its government and control."); Green, 272 S.E.2d at 186.
143. See Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of L.A. v. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541, 556
(Ct. App. 1981) ("[Holy Apostles'] articles contain a specific provision declaring that on liquidation,
dissolution, or abandonment of the corporation its property will insure to the benefit of a charitable
fund organized and operated for religious or charitable purposes by the Diocese. We conclude that
under neutral principles of law the property of Holy Apostles was subject to an express trust in favor
of the Diocese on revocation of its charter .... ), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Fluker Cmty.
Church v. Hitchens, 419 So. 2d 445, 448 (La. 1982) ("[W]e conclude that the presumptive rule of
majority control of use of Tract A has been overcome in favor of the hierarchical organization by
provisions contained in its discipline and in the deed of acquisition.").
on the consent of the local church to be bound by the general church, as
expressed in the documents. "'A
In many ways, these interpretational categories do little to clear up the
conflicting results across the spectrum of state courts, in large part because
the neutral principles approach and both of its subcategories can yield
different results given the same facts, depending on how the court in
question applies the standard. 145 Indeed, it is precisely this variation that has
led many commentators writing since the Jones decision to question whether
this patchwork of constitutional principles and fact-laden analysis is the best
way to resolve the difficult issues presented by church property disputes in
semi-hierarchical denominations. In the next section, these criticisms and
some proposed solutions will be examined and evaluated. At the same time,
it is also possible that the equitable interest in dealing with parties based on
their circumstances in each particular case outweighs the need for
uniformity-it would behoove courts to keep in mind Emerson's warning
that "[a] foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds."146
III. ANALYSIS: WHAT OUGHT To BE THE STANDARD FOR CIVIL COURT
INVOLVEMENT IN INTRACHURCH DISPUTES?
A. Giving Hierarchical Deference its Due
While the neutral-principles-of-law approach is currently followed, at
least in name, by more states than any other approach, the older hierarchical-
deference model is still relevant, and not only because it is currently in force
in a number of other jurisdictions. 14  Several of the solutions proposed by
commentators for resolving the problems with the neutral-principles
approach result in precisely the same outcome as hierarchical deference,
albeit utilizing a significantly different rationale to get there. 1
48
144. Compare Draskovich v. Pasalich, 280 N.E.2d 69, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) ("[T]he local
church in South Bend was organized as a church within the hierarchy of the Mother Church and
therefore those who remain loyal to the Mother Church are entitled to control and use of the property
in question."), with Fonken v. Cmty. Church of Kamrar, 339 N.w.2d 810, 818 (Iowa 1983) ("[T]he
Book of Order gives [the general church] exclusive ultimate control of the uses and disposition of
local church property. Local church property decisions are subject to general church approval, and
the general church may take over local church government, as it did in this case, when it disagrees
with local church handling of church affairs.").
145. See, e.g., infra notes 179-201 and accompanying text.
146. 5 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRAITS 63, 70 (Charles
W. Eliot ed., P. F. Collier & Son Co. 1909).
147. See discussion supra Part iI.D.
148. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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1. Is the Deference Approach Actually Required by the Constitution?
Because the neutral-principles approach has been so widely adopted
following Jones, it is vital to consider the strongest objections to it, and the
Jones dissent is the logical place to begin. In his opinion, which garnered
the support of three of his colleagues, Justice Powell 49 rebuked the
majority's adoption of the neutral-principles approach and especially the
majority's language endorsing neutral principles over Watson's hierarchical-
deference approach. 5 ° In Justice Powell's view, the new standard was a
step in the wrong direction, both in terms of the difficulty in applying it and
in the risk it posed of requiring civil courts to adjudicate religious questions
in violation of the First Amendment. '51
Justice Powell's main objections were based on two factors: first, his
insistence that "[d]isputes among church members over the control of church
property arise almost invariably out of disagreements regarding doctrine and
practice[,]"J 52 and second, his equally strong insistence that American
religious organizations are by nature voluntary, and that by deciding to join
such a body, a person consents to be bound by the decisions of that body, at
least as to the resolution of disputed questions of faith. '53 According to
Justice Powell, these principles necessitated a particular response from the
civil courts:
[I]n each case involving an intrachurch dispute-including disputes
over church property-the civil court must focus directly on
ascertaining, and then following, the decision made within the
structure of church governance. By doing so, the court avoids two
equally unacceptable departures from the genuine neutrality
mandated by the First Amendment. First, it refrains from direct
review and revision of decisions of the church on matters of
religious doctrine and practice that underlie the church's
determination of intrachurch controversies, including those that
relate to control of church property. Equally important, by
recognizing the authoritative resolution reached within the religious
149. Incidentally, Justice Powell was himself a Presbyterian. THE SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 246 (Lee Epstein et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996).
150. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 610-11 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
151. Id.at610.
152. Id. at 616.
153. Id. at 617 ("All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this
government, and are bound to submit to it." (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729
(1871) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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association, the civil court avoids interfering indirectly with the
religious governance of those who have formed the association and
submitted themselves to its authority. 1
54
For Justice Powell and his colleagues in the dissent, hierarchical
deference was the only constitutionally acceptable option. Although the
Court has not spoken expressly since Jones on the matter of church property
disputes, it has declined to hear cases in which the lower courts followed the
neutral-principles approach.' 55  Thus, it appears that Justice Powell's
insistence on hierarchical deference as the only constitutionally acceptable
standard is unlikely to prevail, barring an unforeseen shift in First
Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the trends in both Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause jurisprudence are toward increased deference to the
states, 156 so as long as both approaches continue to be constitutionally valid,
such diversity of application appears likely to continue.
2. Weaknesses of Hierarchical Deference
Although both the majority opinion in Jones and subsequent practice
have allowed hierarchical deference to continue, it has not been without its
detractors. There are two main grounds upon which the hierarchical-
deference approach is criticized: its unequal treatment of semi-hierarchical
and congregational religious groups, and its tendency to invariably support
the decisions of the general church regardless of the circumstances of those
decisions.
According to Professor Greenawalt, the hierarchical-deference approach
"contains an anomaly that is so evidently impossible to justify, it will almost
certainly not survive. The anomaly is the different treatment accorded
congregational and hierarchical churches once their polity is determined." 11
7
Because congregational churches and their members are dealt with by civil
154. Id. at 618 (footnote and citations omitted).
155. See. e.g., Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of L.A. v. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541,
555 (Ct. App. 1981) (applying neutral principles of law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981).
156. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(giving states significant leeway to pass "valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability" even if
such laws conflict with some citizens' religious beliefs) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States v. Lee, 445 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))); Locke v. Davey, 540
U.S. 712, 718-19 (2004) (discussing the "play in the joints" between the Free Exercise and
Establishment clauses, which allows states some flexibility in enacting laws concerning religion)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)));
Steven K. Green, Religion Clause Federalism: State Flexibility Over Religious Matters and the
"One-Way Ratchet," 56 EMORY L.J. 107, 107 (2006) ("[Wle are witnessing an expansion of church-
state collaborations at the state and local levels that deviate from a unitary, 'one-size fits all'
model.") (citation omitted).
157. Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 1866.
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courts on the same terms as secular voluntary associations, aggrieved
members may seek civil court protection of certain common-law rights in
their relations with the church. 15 8 Under the hierarchical-deference standard,
members of hierarchical or semi-hierarchical congregations, on the other
hand, may be deprived of all such rights as long as the denomination
determines they should be. 5 9
Another objection to the hierarchical-deference approach arises from the
observation that it inherently favors one party to litigation (viz., the general
church) over the other (the local congregation), regardless of the particulars
of the situation, including who bought or donated the property and who
maintained it. This tendency was perhaps best summed up by the Supreme
Court of Kentucky in Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the
United States of America of the Diocese of Lexington, in which that court
outlined its reasoning for adopting the neutral-principles approach. 60  The
court observed that
[w]hile the neutral-principles doctrine may not be the panacea
foreseen by the majority in Jones v. Wolf, in cases such as this, the
application of neutral-principles appears to be preferable to
compulsory deference since in every case, regardless of the facts,
compulsory deference would result in the triumph of the
hierarchical organization. 161
The general effect of adopting an approach that always leads to the
victory of the general church in any such dispute at least raises questions
158. The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that
[a] member of a congregational church, seeking the aid of the court in protecting his civil
and property rights, may appeal only to the simple and fundamental principles of
democratic government which are universally accepted in our society. These principles
include the right to reasonable notice, the right to attend and advocate one's views, and
the right to an honest count of the votes. Such rights are fundamental to our notions of
due process. They are neutral principles of law, applicable not only to religious bodies,
but to public and private lay organizations and to civil governments as well. Courts must
apply them every day, and can do so without any danger of entering a "religious thicket."
Therefore, the authorities which preclude the courts from examining whether an
hierarchical church correctly followed its own internal procedures, or correctly applied its
canon law, are inapposite to the question before us.
Reid v. Gholson, 327 S.E.2d 107, 113 (Va. 1985).
159. Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 1866.
160. Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S. of the Diocese of Lexington, 759
S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1988).
161. Id.at586.
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about whether that approach tends toward an impermissible establishment of
religion. 62  Furthermore, deferring to the decision of a tribunal which is
itself an arm of the general church potentially raises concerns about self-
interested decision-making. 1
63
At first glance, Justice Powell's contractual vision of hierarchical
congregations detailed in his Jones dissent does away with both of these
objections. After all, the member knew and understood (or should have, at
least) the decision-making power of the internal structures of the church
hierarchy before joining, and willfully chose to submit to those authorities.
However, as Professor Greenawalt has pointed out, any such contractual
commitment made by the affiliating parties may have been conditioned,
perhaps expressly but more likely by unspoken expectation, on the
continuance of the hierarchy to remain on the course it has followed in the
past. 164  Greenawalt notes that radical changes may be enacted at the
denominational level, and asks whether "local church members mean to
adhere to hierarchical decisions in such altered conditions, rather than to the
principles prevailing when they decided to join, or to local officials who
refuse to follow the hierarchy."'
165
Based on these objections, the "members' expectations" rationale for
strict hierarchical deference is a weak justification for the approach.
Nevertheless, hierarchical deference is not only constitutionally permissible,
but alive and in active use in many states. 166
B. Neutral Principles in Theory and Practice
In giving its official approval to the neutral-principles approach in
Jones, the Supreme Court extolled several virtues it felt commended the
approach over earlier methods, and particularly over hierarchical deference.
This litany of praise is worth examining in full:
162. Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 1876-77.
163. See, e.g., Cal.-Nev. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church v. St. Luke's United
Methodist Church, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442, 454 (Ct. App. 2004) ("We know of no principle of trust law
stating that a trust can be created by the declaration of a nonowner that the owner holds the property
as trustee for the nonowner.").
164. Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 1874.
165. Id. Greenawalt also considers that denominational particulars may have a profound impact
on the expectations of the parties:
Roman Catholics may continue to have a sense that their main attachment is to an
international church. In contrast, many Protestants now join a local church that seems
suitable, with relatively little concern about the general denomination; they switch
denominations freely and, regardless of denomination, may consider the congregational
government of their local church as most important.
Id. at 1875.
166. See Appendix, infra.
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The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that
it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to
accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity. The
method relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of
trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby
promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in
questions of religious doctrine, polity, andpraetice. 167
Although the Court acknowledged that there might be some problems in
applying the neutral-principles approach, particularly when courts are asked
to examine relevant documents containing religious language and to discern
the secular effect of those provisions, 168 it also expressed confidence that in
the final analysis, the benefits of the approach, particularly in its "promise of
nonentanglement and neutrality," outweighed any difficulties it might
present to lower courts in the future. 
69
1. How the Neutral-Principles-of-Law Approach Has Actually
Worked
While the particular promises foreseen by the Jones majority may have
been fulfilled, at least to some extent, the neutral-principles approach has
yielded another result, unforeseen, or at least unmentioned by the Court in
Jones: massive inconsistency in the application of the doctrine. This
167. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (emphases added). The Court continued:
Furthermore, the neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-law
systems in general-flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the
intentions of the parties. Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions,
religious societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the event of a
particular contingency, or what religious body will determine the ownership in the event
of a schism or doctrinal controversy. In this manner, a religious organization can ensure
that a dispute over the ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the
desires of the members.
Id. at 603-04.
168. Id. at 604 ("This is not to say that the application of the neutral-principles approach is wholly
free of difficulty. The neutral-principles method . . . requires a civil court to examine certain
religious documents, such as a church constitution, for language of trust in favor of the general
church. In undertaking such an examination, a civil court must take special care to scrutinize the
document in purely secular terms .... In addition, there may be cases where the deed, the corporate
charter, or the constitution of the general church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions
relating to the ownership of property. If in such a case the interpretation of the instruments of
ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer
to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body." (citation omitted)).
169. Id.
variance, which some commentators predicted shortly after Jones was
handed down, stems primarily from a lack of guidance given by the Court
for the application of the approach. 170  The variety in positions goes far
beyond the two main interpretational categories discussed above (strict-
neutral-principles and hybrid of hierarchical-deference and neutral-
principles), and has been the subject of much criticism, both from scholars 17'
and from the judges whose duties require them to undertake the application
of the standard. 72 Indeed, one judge contemplating subsequent state court
church property dispute jurisprudence has called the current situation "a
welter of contradictory and confusing case law largely devoid of certainty,
consistency, or sustained analysis."'1
73
Confusion centers around two related issues: whether and to what extent
a trust in favor of the general church must be express to be recognized, and
what burden the general church must carry in establishing the trust. 74 Some
states require an express trust, on the ground that church property disputes
do not generally lend themselves to the analysis courts normally undertake
when determining whether property is subject to an implied trust, 75 while
other jurisdictions (still purportedly applying neutral principles) find in favor
of the general church even when the minimal standards for implied trusts are
not satisfied. 76  Still other courts have entertained the possibility that the
circumstances of the parties' relationship over time may indicate the local
congregation should be estopped from denying its intent to give the general
church control of the property. 177  In regard to the burden of showing the
170. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Constitutional Dimensions of Church Property Disputes, 59
WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 77-79 (1981); Robert A. Recio, Note, Jones v. Wolf: Church Property Disputes
and Judicial Intrusion into Church Governance, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 538, 562 (1981). Of course,
because the Jones Court was merely approving a standard rather than mandating one, the Court was
not obligated to give guidance.
171. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 97, passim; Hansen, supra note 36, at 296; Alderman, supra note
98, at 1043-51; Nathan Clay Belzer, Deference in the Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch Disputes:
The Lesser of Two Constitutional Evils, II ST. THOMAS L. REV. 109, 130-35 (1998).
172. See, e.g., John E. Fennelly, Property Disputes and Religious Schisms: Who Is the Church?, 9
ST. THOMAS L. REv. 319, 353 (1997).
173. Id.
174. Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 1894.
175. Id. (citing Gerstenblith, supra note 100, at 554-56).
176. See, e.g., Kendysh v. Holy Spirit Byelorussian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, 683 F. Supp.
1501, 1510-12 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1988).
177. See, e.g., Crumbley v. Solomon, 254 S.E.2d 330, 333 (Ga. 1979). This often includes
consideration of the failure of a local congregation to object to or seek disaffiliation after a change to
general-church documents which purports to alter the legal rights of the parties. For example, the
Georgia Supreme Court noted that the local church at issue in Crumbley did not challenge the trust
provision at issue for more than three decades, and stated that because it "remained a member of the
Association and accepted the benefits flowing from that relationship, it cannot now deny the
existence of a trust for the benefit of the general church." Id. Justice Bowles, writing in dissent,
noted the majority's use of estoppel language and chastised the majority for departing from Georgia
precedent precluding such an estoppel theory. Id. at 336-37 (Bowles, J., dissenting).
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existence of a trust, some courts have required different levels for the
general and local churches, while others have placed the parties on equal
footing. '78
The result of these discrepancies in applying the neutral-principles
approach is that courts purporting to employ neutral principles in the same
way actually place themselves in different interpretational categories, not
only from state to state but even within states in some cases. 7 9 A prime
example is found in the conflicting decisions of California's Courts of
Appeal.180 As discussed earlier, the 1981 Barker decision expressly applied
the neutral-principles approach, and until very recently, California courts
had employed that approach, though sometimes in very different ways.'
18
The Second District's use of neutral principles in Korean United
Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of the Pacific182 and Guardian Angel
Polish National Catholic Church of Los Angeles, Inc. v. Grotnik83 is simply
inconsistent with that of the Fifth District in California-Nevada Annual
Conference of the United Methodist Church v. St. Luke's Methodist
Church. 184 Although both courts stated that the neutral-principles approach
was the governing standard in California, the Korean United and Guardian
Angel courts took what was essentially a hybrid approach,'85 while the court
in St. Luke's sharply criticized the decision in Guardian Angel and followed
the Barker court's strict-neutral-principles analysis. 1
86
Korean United involved a dispute among the members of the Korean
United Presbyterian Church, a Los Angeles congregation of the PC(USA)
and the "oldest Korean immigrant congregation in the United States."' 7
About seventy to eighty-five percent of the members sided with Rev. Sang
Born Woo and against the Presbytery, which designated Rev. Woo and his
adherents as the "dissident" faction of the church and asserted ownership of
178. Gerstenblith, supra note 100, at 544.
179. Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 1903. For a further discussion of these discrepancies, see
Alderman, supra note 98, at 1043-50.
180. Of course, with the Fourth District's June 2007 opinion in In re Episcopal Church Cases, it is
now unclear whether California courts are to apply neutral principles at all. 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845 (Ct.
App. 2007), review granted, (Sept. 12, 2007).
181. See supra notes 123-132 and accompanying text.
182. 281 Cal. Rptr. 396 (Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1991) (finding for general church), overruled on other
grounds by Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, 872 P.2d 143 (1994).
183. 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 552 (Ct. App. 2 Dist. 2004) (finding for general church).
184. 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442 (Ct. App. 5 Dist. 2004) (finding for local congregation).
185. Guardian Angel, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561.
186. St. Luke's, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 454-55.
187. Korean United, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
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the congregation's resources on behalf of the fifteen to thirty percent
representing the "true church."'' 88 In finding for the PC(USA), the Korean
United court stated that the California Corporations Code created a
presumption that denominational trust rules were enforceable in
California. 8 9
Guardian Angel built on the decision in Korean United and involved a
Los Angeles parish of the Polish National Catholic Church (PNCC). 190
Despite its name, the PNCC is not in communion with the Roman Catholic
Church, and unlike that body is not organized on strictly hierarchical
grounds.' 9' The parish's board of directors voted to disaffiliate with the
national church, and the trial court found that under the neutral-principles
approach, the property belonged to the parish. 92  The appellate court
disagreed, giving precedence to the PNCC's internal rules over California
statutes governing nonprofit associations.193  The court found that, even
under the neutral-principles approach, "[p]rovisions found in the general
church's constitution 'can override any right the majority of a local
congregation might otherwise have to control the local church property." 94
Provisions in the national church constitution required diocesan approval of
the board of directors for decisions of that board to be valid, and because the
board of directors was not approved, its actions to repeal the parish's bylaws
and withdraw from the PNCC were likewise invalid. 195  Based on the
constitution and the (unrepealed) bylaws, the court found that the property
was held in trust for the national denomination. 1
96
In St. Luke's, a Methodist congregation was found by both the trial court
and the appellate court to have created a trust in its property in favor of the
national church. 19 However, while the trial court found the trust irrevocable
by the parish under a California statute, the appellate court found that the
trial court's interpretation of the statute at issue (based on the Korean United
opinion) conflicted with "basic principles of trust law," which state that the
settlor, or maker of a trust (in this case, the parish), may revoke it, as the
parish in fact did. ' 98 In its opinion, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth District
noted that its decision conflicted with the Second Circuit's Korean United
188. Id. at 398-99.
189. Id. at412-13.
190. Guardian Angel, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 553.
191. PNCC.org: Our History, http://www.pncc.org/whojhistory.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
192. Guardian Angel, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 558, 560-61.
193. Id. at 561.
194. Id. at 560 (quoting Metropolitan Philip v. Steiger, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 605, 610 (Ct. App. 2000)).
195. Id. at 557, 560-61.
196. Id. at 561.
197. Cal.-Nev. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church v. St. Luke's Methodist
Church, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442, 450-51 (Ct. App. 2004).
198. Id. at 452-53.
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and Guardian Angel decisions, and strongly criticized those opinions as
essentially giving dispositive weight to the determination of the general
church, in a manner essentially indistinguishable from the hierarchical-
deference approach, despite the strict-neutral-principles precedent of
Barker.'99 The St. Luke's court concluded by stating:
[W]e respectfully disagree with the view that acts of a board of
directors of a lawfully formed corporation may be viewed by a civil
court to be a nullity simply because those acts are deemed
unauthorized not by any recognized rule of state law, but rather only
by the general church's own rules. In Barker the court stated:
"Essentially, the hierarchical theory subordinates civil control of
church property to ecclesiastical control of church property. Under
this theory the canons and rules of a general church override general
principles of legal title in the resolution of church controversies
over property." Although the hierarchical theory has supposedly
been rejected in California, it will nevertheless live on under the
label of "neutral principles of law, " if a church's own rules are
viewed as trumping state statutes."2 '
This type of split may result even when a jurisdiction has expressly
placed itself in one of the two narrower interpretational categories, either
strict-neutral-principles or a hybrid of neutral-principles and hierarchical-
deference. 2 '
199. Id. at 455-56.
200. Id. at 456 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Again, the Court of Appeal's In re Episcopal
Church Cases opinion means that it is by no means clear that hierarchical deference has been
rejected in California-the decision says precisely the opposite, that the entire Barker line of cases
ignores the California Supreme Court's last word on the matter, and that neither the strict-neutral-
principles interpretation of St. Luke's nor the nominally neutral-principles hybrid interpretation of
Korean United and Guardian Angel are warranted under California law. In re Episcopal Church
Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 894-95 (Ct. App. 2007), review granted, (Sept. 12, 2007). Furthermore,
the Episcopal Church Cases court rejected the St. Luke's court's interpretation of the California
Corporations Code, holding that in hierarchically organized churches, the general church (rather than
the parish) is the settlor. Id. at 878-84. The California Supreme Court's unanimous grant of review
in In re Episcopal Church Cases on September 12, 2007 means there may soon be a resolution to at
least this threshold question. See Docket (Register of Actions) for In Re Episcopal Church Cases,
No. S155094, (Sept. 12, 2007), http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist =
0&doc id=484283&docno=S 155094.
201. Hansen, supra note 36, at 296.
2. Lesser Proposals for Resolving the Inconsistencies
Must these inconsistencies be resolved? The conflicts between states
are perhaps not terribly problematic because the substantive areas of law
implicated by the neutral-principles approach, such as property, trust, and
corporate law, have traditionally been areas controlled by state law.
However, there are two arguments for the proposition that anything beyond
the mildest of discrepancies requires some correction. First, as noted above,
there have been some splits between courts in the same state.2 °2 Second,
allowing for a vast multiplication in the variety of reasoning within each
constitutionally acceptable approach places a substantial burden on the
general churches, which as national organizations would be hard pressed to
litigate under as many as fifty (or more) different legal standards.20 3 The
first is more defensible as a justification for judicial intervention. As to the
second, it seems evident that by allowing parishes to acquire and hold title to
real property, general churches have enjoyed relief from the administrative
burdens and liabilities bome by more centralized bodies such as the Roman
Catholic Church and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. The
tradeoff may be that granting this allowance could significantly weaken the
general church's claim of ownership.
If courts must resolve these discrepancies, how should they approach
this task? Commentators disagree on the most important values civil courts
should consider when deciding church property disputes. Some argue that
maintaining standards which treat the parties equally should be paramount,
because otherwise courts run the risk of "establishing one religious faction at
the expense of the free exercise rights of the other., 20 4 Of course, treating
the parties equally generally requires a very intensive search into the
circumstances, upon which the result may turn. Where the controversy itself
may be religious in nature or have religious aspects, this depth of inquiry can
raise its own First Amendment problems, because the court may be asked to
tread close to the line of resolving doctrinal or theological matters. Others
contend that the primary concern in establishing a standard should be
predictability and consistency, even if that comes at a substantial cost to the
equal treatment of the parties. 205
202. See supra note 123; see also supra notes 179-201 and accompanying text.
203. Although regional bodies such as Presbyteries and Dioceses are sometimes the main litigants
on the general church side, these entities sometimes span state lines and thus raise the same concern.
204. Gerstenblith, supra note 43, at 317; see also Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 1904.
205. See, e.g., Belzer, supra note 171, at 135 ("It is unquestioned that religious bodies are free to
organize themselves and their system of govemance in any manner that they deem appropriate.
However, if religious institutions cannot predict the outcomes of potential disputes their ability to
organize church polity is significantly curtailed. Predictability in the resolution of intrachurch
disputes is essential to the First Amendment's guarantee of Free Exercise, because only with
predictability will churches be truly free to exercise their ecclesiastical choices regarding polity and
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With these principles in mind, commentators have prescribed a number
of treatments they hope will heal what all agree is a diseased patient,
namely, the corpus of American law dealing with church property disputes.
Most (though not all206) support some version of the neutral-principles
approach, though, like decisions employing that reasoning, they differ
considerably on what the proper scope of a neutral-principles analysis
should be.
a. Neutral Principles, but Allowing for Some Implied Trusts (Hybrid
Approach)
Many of these objections lead critics of the strict-neutral-principles
approach to contend that the hybrid interpretation is more likely to give
effect to the intent of the parties, as it allows courts to imply trusts or
contracts in some cases provided they find reason to do so upon examination
of the documents (subject always, of course, to the constitutional bar on
deciding matters of doctrine).20 7 According to this line of reasoning, the
hybrid approach takes into account the purported inability or unwillingness
of churches to draft instruments that clearly invite civil perusal and allows
the conflict to be settled without offending constitutional principles.2 8
Many of the objections to this approach have already been discussed;
they include most notably the assertion of a tie between implied trusts and
the forbidden English rule approach, the inscrutability of the grantor's intent
when circumstances have changed dramatically, and the argument that
secular judges are ill-equipped for and possibly constitutionally forbidden
from making guesses about the religious purposes which may underlie
ambiguous language in the documents of both parties.20 9 Taken together,
these defects make the hybrid approach dangerous on both constitutional and
fairness grounds, and should lead courts to reject its implementation.
organization." (footnotes omitted)).
206. See id. (decrying the inconsistencies inherent in any neutral-principles approach and arguing
that hierarchical deference is the only constitutionally appropriate standard).
207. Hansen, supra note 36, at 301.
208. Id. at 301-02.
209. See supra notes 47-51, 164-66, 168-69 and accompanying text.
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b. Neutral Principles, but General-Church Trust Clauses are
Dispositive
In 1987, William G. Ross posited that predictability in the application of
neutral principles of law could most easily be obtained if the national
churches adopted express trust clauses in their own constitutions, making
clear the relationship between the national church and the local bodies. 10 In
doing so, Ross relied on a paragraph in the Jones decision, which proposed
that in anticipation of adjudication under the neutral-principles approach, the
general church's constitution "can be made to recite an express trust in favor
of the denominational church .... And the civil courts will be bound to
give effect to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in
some legally cognizable form." 211  Ross noted that the mainline Episcopal
and Presbyterian churches had adopted such clauses following the Jones
decision, and speculated that the changes would mandate the most
predictable result-court victory for the national church in every case-and
also result in a decrease in the number of lawsuits over church property."
Suffice it to say that things have not quite gone that way. The flow of
church property cases has not abated, despite the adoption of express trust
clauses in the constitutions of general churches, and the results of those
actions have been anything but uniform, at least in neutral-principles-of-law
jurisdictions. 213  The primary reason for the failure of the churches'
constitutional provisions to definitively resolve each dispute is that many
courts applying the neutral-principles approach have considered it their duty
to look not only to the constitution of the general church, but to other
relevant documents as well, including the deeds and articles of incorporation
of local congregations and relevant state statutes.1 Enough courts applying
the Jones neutral-principles approach have given equal weight to each of
these documents that it is obvious that constitutional changes by the general
churches, in and of themselves, are insufficient to resolve these matters.
21 5
Denominational trust clauses have been subjected to criticism apart from
their lack of dispositive effect. In addition to the attacks on the validity and
210. Ross, supra note 97, at 313-15.
211. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979).
212. Ross, supra note 171, at 314 ("Although courts have not yet had occasion to construe the
effect of those provisions, it seems clear that under either . . approach a court must hold that the
national church controls local property." (emphasis added)). Ross also posited that "[local
churches will recognize that an express trust in favor of the national church will compel summary
judgment in favor of the national church." Id.
213. See supra notes 179-201 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of L.A. v. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541,
553-55 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864(1981).
215. See supra notes 179-201 and accompanying text.
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the fairness of the clauses discussed above,2 16 there have been significant
objections to reliance solely on purported trust provisions on the grounds
that they fail to reflect the mutual intent of the parties, as required by the
language in Jones, which stated that "the civil courts will be bound to give
effect to the result indicated by the parties.' , 2 17  In the words of one
commentator, the Court in Jones "apparently presumed that national
adoption of any proposed amendments would be contingent on relevant,
local ratification. 2t5 At least some courts have taken this approach, holding
that national trust clauses adopted after the local congregations joined the
denomination failed to reflect the intent of both parties to create a trust
relationship, and thus could not be enforced without additional confirmation
of the parties' intent.29 Other commentators have suggested that even when
trust clauses predate a local congregation's affiliation with the general
church, acceptance of the trust clause may be compulsory for admittance to
the denomination, and thus may not actually represent the intent of the
congregation.22 o
On balance, denominational trust clauses by themselves are not
dispositive and in fact raise numerous other objections.22' Consequently,
these clauses do not provide a definitive means of resolving the confusion in
the application of neutral principles of law.
c. Neutral Principles, but Inquiry Limited by General Church
Constitution
Another somewhat related possibility is that the interests of the parties
would best be served by a limited version of the neutral-principles approach
that operated by restricting the inquiry to only what is permitted by the
216. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text; Hansen, supra note 36, at 300.
217. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979) (emphasis added).
218. Lunceford, supra note 26, at 34-35.
219. See Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 555. Even in denominations with a relatively representative
form of governance, an adoption by the national church of an amendment adding a trust clause to its
constitution may not be of sufficient legal force to bind individual congregations. Lunceford notes
that
[i]n the Presbyterian Church (USA) . . . the adoption of amendments to the denomin-
ation's constitution occurs by vote of a requisite number of regional presbyteries, rather
than by a vote of local churches. And it is often stated within the denomination that the
individuals who participate in a presbytery vote do not act in a representative capacity on
behalf of a local church.
Lunceford, supra note 26, at 35.
220. Hansen, supra note 36, at 301.
221. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
general church constitution. Indeed, such a methodology has been proposed
in the wake of the adoption of trust clauses and their failure to conclusively
resolve church property disputes. 222  This church constitution-focused
approach could yield three possible outcomes: first, the church constitution
could be made to specify that civil courts should defer to the determinations
of the ecclesiastical body; second, the constitution could be made to list
certain documents to which civil courts would be allowed to look in
determining the property ownership; and third, the constitution could be left
223silent on the issue. One commentator argues that such an approach would
allow civil courts to enforce contractual agreements between the parties in
the first two cases, and to enforce state property law in the third.224
The first outcome suffers from the same inherent weaknesses as reliance
on denominational trust clauses, namely, the lack of mutual intent of the
parties to create a trust. These criticisms also apply on a more general level
to all three possibilities: because local congregations have little influence
over the amendment of denominational constitutions, restricting the scope of
the civil court inquiry to only whatever is permitted by those constitutions
renders the contract rationale almost wholly inapposite. 225 Local parishes,
particularly those representing a minority view in the denomination, will be
unable to influence the amendment process, and because most general
churches require only a majority to enact constitutional changes, a local
church may be attacked based on a provision it strongly opposed-a
principle which may work well for democratic government, but which
completely fails a contract analysis.226 Further, any restriction of the inquiry
to the general church constitution would ignore the "facts on the ground":
who bought or donated the property, who maintained the property, and so
forth. Regardless of what provisions the general church decides to adopt,
the approach essentially becomes a stand-in for hierarchical deference 227 and
completely forsakes the courts' interest in equal treatment of the parties.
d. Neutral Principles, but Limited to Secular Documents
If limiting the courts' inquiry to only church documents is not workable,
would a version of the neutral-principles approach that did the opposite
better address the issues implicated in church property disputes? What if
courts seeking to discern the parties' intent were forbidden from considering
222. Alderman, supra note 98, at 1055-63.
223. See id. at 1057-59.
224. Id. at 1060.
225. See supra notes 216-219 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
227. See Alderman, supra note 98 at 1061 ("Even if the effect of these changes is a de facto
deference regime, it will be deference at the choice of the church and not the court.").
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any religious documents, including church constitutions, but were permitted
to examine only secular documents such as "deeds, corporation papers, and
other legal documents"? 228 Would such a test, proposed by Professor Sirico
and premised on the idea that courts often lack the competence to ascertain
the details of church structure and particularly the parties' intent, 229 provide
a workable standard?
There are at least a few drawbacks to a secular-documents approach.
The first is that applying the test to situations in which the relationship was
established before the secular-documents approach was even contemplated
might lead to "very unfair results," because the parties might have organized
their affairs under the assumption that all relevant documents would be
considered in any later controversy. 230 A further issue is suggested by
Professor Sirico's own admission that the secular-documents test contains a
bias in favor of the general churches, arising from their technical
sophistication in drafting secular documents.23 Viewed in another light,
however, it seems that there is at least an equal chance of a bias in the other
direction. Faced with the prospect of the implementation of a secular
documents test, general churches, which up to now had relied upon such
devices as denominational trust clauses, would be forced to attempt to adopt,
or force local congregations to adopt, secular documents reflecting the
principles the general churches insisted were always in effect. Particularly
in light of the current strife within the mainline churches, it seems unlikely
that local parishes would willingly accede to such attempts.
e. Free Speech Protection as Substitute or Shortcut?
Another intriguing possibility is raised by the trial court's joint
resolution of the three cases in California under the name of Rasmussen v.
Bunyan,232 now on appeal as In re Episcopal Church Cases, which presented
a new "twist" on church property disputes, under which the defendant party
files a special motion to strike, alleging that the lawsuit is being brought to
228. Sirico, supra note 170, at 357.
229. Id. at 358.
230. Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 1886.
231. Sirico, supra note 170, at 358.
232. Rasmussen v. Bunyan, No. 04CC00647, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County Sept. 9,
2005); Adair v. Poch, No. BC321 101, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Sept. 9, 2005);
O'Halloran v. Thompson, No. BC321102, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Sept. 9, 2005), all
rev 'd sub nom. In re Episcopal Church Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845 (Ct. App. 2007), review granted,
(Sept. 12, 2007). The cases were consolidated as Rasmussen v. Bunyan for adjudication by the
Orange County Superior Court.
233limit its right to free speech or petition. The parishes seeking to leave the
Diocese of Los Angeles filed a special motion to strike the Diocese's cause
of action, alleging the suit was intended to muzzle the parishes' public
statements about their religious reasons for disaffiliating and, thus, a
"strategic lawsuit against public participation" ("SLAPP") barred by
California statute.3 California allows challenges to alleged SLAPPs, and
the lawsuit in question will be dismissed if (1) the court finds it is intended
to stop or punish acts "in furtherance of the [defendant's] right of petition or
free speech . . . in connection with a public issue" and (2) the plaintiff is
unlikely to prevail on the merits. 235 The trial court in Rasmussen found that
both prongs were met and granted the local churches' special motion to
strike.236
As commentary following the Rasmussen decision has noted, several
states in addition to California, including Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Utah, and Washington
have similar anti-SLAPP provisions.237 It is conceivable that local churches
in these states might make anti-SLAPP arguments, particularly given the
success of the tactic in Rasmussen, at least at the trial court level. A further
wrinkle is that in some states, such as Louisiana, the anti-SLAPP statute
includes a provision allowing for the awarding of reasonable attorney fees
and costs for a party filing a successful anti-SLAPP motion.238
However, the trial-court anti-SLAPP success of the Rasmussen plaintiffs
may be merely a short-lived aberration. As noted above, on appeal the
decision of the trial court was reversed, and in addition to rejecting the
constitutional standard employed by the trial court to resolve the second
anti-SLAPP prong, the appellate panel held that the anti-SLAPP statute did
not even apply to the matter. 239 The court took particular pains to reject the
notion that the parishes' reasons for disaffiliation could be the basis for an
anti-SLAPP motion in what was essentially a pure question of property
control:
233. Yaw, supra note 98, at 833.
234. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
235. § 425.16(b)(1).
236. Rasmussen, No. 04CC00647 at 1. It is important to note that the granting of an anti-SLAPP
motion is not a recognition by the granting court of a free-speech right in the parish to withdraw
from a denomination with its property intact. Rather, it is a finding that but for the expressive
actions taken by parishes wishing to publicly disassociate themselves from the general church's
views, the lawsuit would not have been filed. Id. at 8. The court in Rasmussen found that "[t]he root
of the instant controversy is defendants' public disaffiliation from the Church over doctrinal issues
rather than simply an alleged change in the control of the property." Id.
237. Yaw, supra note 98, at 837 & n.203.
238. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971(B) (2005).
239. In re Episcopal Church Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 852 (Ct. App. 2007) ("The trial court
therefore erred in concluding that the first prong was satisfied."), review granted, (Sept. 12, 2007).
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[I]t makes no difference why the defendants are disaffiliating, the
point is they are being sued for asserting control over the local
parish property to the exclusion of a right to control asserted by the
plaintiffs. The fact that a religious controversy may have prompted
the dispute over the right to control the property does not mean the
defendants are being sued for the "protected activity" of changing
their religion.
•.. This complaint could stand alone as a simple dispute over
who controls certain real property, and hence does not implicate any
protected activity on the part of the local church. 240
The parishes asked the California Supreme Court to review the Court of
Appeal's decision, and the petition was unanimously granted on September
12, 2007.241 Thus, the fate of anti-SLAPP motions as applied to California
church property disputes remains unresolved for now, but may be settled in
the coming months. An affirmation of the Court of Appeal's reasoning
would essentially close the door on this novel application, and provide
strong ammunition in the form of persuasive authority for parties seeking to
defend against anti-SLAPP motions in other jurisdictions that allow them.
Even if courts take the approach of the Rasmussen trial court and find
that suits by general churches against parishes disaffiliating out of religious
protest are indeed SLAPPs, "anti-SLAPP motions" are unlikely to change
the eventual outcome, as courts ruling on them are still required to weigh the
plaintiffs chance of success.2 42 Making such a determination requires the
court to make a full examination of the substantive questions governed by
the jurisdiction's chosen standard from Watson or Jones just as it would in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary dismissal. 243
Accordingly, although local churches seeking the protection of an anti-
SLAPP motion may be able to draw on another argument-abridgement of
free-speech protections-that argument is insufficient on its own to ward off
240. Id. at 851-52 (emphases in original).
241. Docket (Register of Actions) for In re Episcopal Church Cases, No. S155094, (Sept. 12,
2007), http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc-id=484283&doc_
no=S 155094.
242. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
243. See, e.g., In re Episcopal Church Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 849.
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the claims made by the general church. Of course, the anti-SLAPP motion is
also only available to defendants alleging that the suit is being brought in
response to an assertion of free speech rights, and thus will likely not be
relevant in circumstances where the procedural posture of the parties is
different (namely, where the suit is brought by the local congregation rather
than the general church).
f Abandoning the Current Regime Entirely
Rather than choosing from among the current options, perhaps with
evidentiary restrictions such as those proposed above, some have suggested
moving entirely away from civil court adjudication of church property
disputes. 244 The proposal is grounded in the idea that taking an arbitration-
based approach relying on the mutual consent of the parties will achieve the
religious value of avoiding protracted confrontation and the antagonism that
frequently results, while steering clear of First Amendment issues that arise
whenever a civil court considers a church property dispute.24 5 Moving the
dispute out of the civil courts allows for the discussion of a wider range of
ideas, including those of a theological nature, recourse to experts more
intimately acquainted with the nature of the parties and possibly their
respective intents, and the promise of resolutions which civil courts have the
power to enforce.246 However, moving to arbitration as the preferred
method of resolving such disputes would also require the parties to move
toward a more corporate footing, one based more on the suspicion inherent
in arm's-length dealing than the hopeful trust and good will which would
seem to fall within the reasonable expectations of parties with shared
religious beliefs.
C. The Best Proposal: Strict Neutral Principles Only
Each of the models discussed above has its own strengths and
weaknesses. In a more perfect world, religious organizations would be able
to manage their own affairs and structure the terms of their own
relationships. Although disputes between religious entities might still arise,
civil courts would not have to resolve them and thus the litany of First
Amendment concerns addressed above would never become an issue. Of
course, this ideal is seldom seen in practice because of diverse factors that
prevent such foresight in structuring relationships, including differing
historical understandings, shifting constitutional standards and a reluctance
244. See, e.g., Michael William Galligan, Note, Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch Disputes, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 2007, 2035-38 (1983).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 2037.
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by religious groups to acknowledge the likelihood or even the possibility of
conflict. The final conclusion one reaches as to which approach courts
should follow likely depends in large part on which competing concern one
considers most important: consistency, or most accurately reflecting the
interests of the parties. The position one takes as to the rights of the parties
at the outset also appears to have a significant influence. 247  This also
presumes that church property disputes are an appropriate area for civil
adjudication, which some constitutional scholars dispute. 48
There is also the very real danger that the parties' arguments will be
clouded by self-interest. In the particular circumstances in which American
mainline Protestant churches find themselves, traditionalist local
congregations and commentators (who more generally favor the autonomy
of religious bodies and restrictions on the influence of secular government
over religion) may realize secular courts are their last recourse in the face of
denominations that have evolved theologically in spite of protest. 249  This
might lead them to espouse the approach that gives them the best chance of
retaining the property they have been using, despite the consequences for
church-state relations more broadly. At the same time, national churches
247. Compare, e.g., Alderman, supra note 98, at 1061 ("Finally, [general] churches.., will most
likely lose property to local break-away congregations .... When these churches begin to lose their
property, the general church or denomination will quickly want to change the constitution.")
(emphases added), with Gerstenblith, supra note 100, at 541 n.177 ("For these three [local] churches,
therefore, the statute was considered inapplicable, and those churches were permitted to keep their
property upon disaffiliation.") (emphasis added).
248. Some commentators, including Douglas Laycock, argue that, at least as to internal matters,
the voluntary and sectarian nature of religious organizations in America should render conflicts
between constituent parts of those groups totally beyond the competence of secular civil authority.
Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1403-04 (1981). Although
Professor Laycock's argument is quite compelling in most instances (including church labor
relations-the focus of his article), it appears to rest on the same "implied consent" foundation as
Justice Powell's dissent in Jones v. Wolf see supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text, and thus
is subject to the same criticisms. See, e.g., supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text (criticizing
the application of the "implied consent" rationale for church autonomy to church property disputes).
249. See Posting of Professor Thomas C. Berg, TCBERG@stthomas.edu, to religionlaw@lists.
ucla.edu (Feb. 8, 2007) (http://lists.ucla.edu/pipermail/religionlaw/2007-February/022368.html)
("The breakaway congregations, now and in the earlier rounds, have tended to be conservatives
unhappy with liberal denominational moves. If they succeed in court against the larger
organizations to whose decisions they object, they tend to make law such as Jones v. Wolf that is
harmful to the protection of religious organizational autonomy against state (in this case court)
interference. Yet conservative faiths also tend to have the most conflicts between their
organizational autonomy and govemment regulation in other contexts, such as suits by clergy, other
employees, or members .... [S]uccesses by conservative Christians in the property cases hurts [sic]
the freedom of conservative Christians in other cases, where Jones v. Wolf has had more effect."
(citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979))).
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that are generally less hostile to interaction with civil government may see
that a more deferential standard best protects their perceived interests, and
invoke the hierarchical-deference or hybrid approaches in hopes of retaining
or gaining an interest in the property at issue.
That said, the current patchwork of hierarchical-deference and neutral-
principles standards, variously applied, is problematic, and in the long run,
probably untenable. The hierarchical-deference approach requires courts to
apply a contractual view of affiliation, based on unconditional implied
consent, that is likely out of touch with the real expectations of local
churches. This disparity probably gives rise to enough concerns about the
burdening of the free exercise rights, property ownership rights, and
corporate autonomy of congregations to rule out both hierarchical deference
and its close cousin, the hybrid approach.
Ultimately, the most cogent and even-handed approach is the strict-
neutral-principles approach described above, advocated by Professor
Gerstenblith.25 °  Its rejection of "implied trusts" and corresponding
requirement of express trusts best protects the interest of equal treatment of
the parties, while also avoiding "problematic connections" with the
unconstitutional English (departure-from-doctrine) rule.25' Under this
rationale, finding an implied trust does not make sense without the English
rule, because it requires speculation as to the grantor's intent.252
Historically, the grantor's continuing intent could be scrutinized by
examining the general church's faithfulness (or lack thereof) to the doctrine
held at the time of the grant; if the church had maintained the same beliefs,
the intent was likely still in effect, and vice versa. 253 Because courts are now
barred under the First Amendment from making such an inquiry, T finding
an implied trust requires a presumption that the grantor's intent was
permanently established regardless of any change the general
church/beneficiary might make.255  In Professor Gerstenblith's words,
"[t]here is no reason to assume that a donor wished to devote the property in
perpetuity to the purposes of the hierarchy rather than to the purposes of the
individual church, because both ... are free to change their interpretations
and practice of religious doctrine. 256  Instead, civil courts should only
250. See supra notes 112-122 and accompanying text.
251. Gerstenblith, supra note 43, at 333-42; see also supra note 130. The English rule is
discussed in detail in the text accompanying supra notes 44-51
252. Gerstenblith, supra note 43, at 334.
253. Id.
254. See Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450-52 (1969).
255. Gerstenblith, supra note 43, at 334-35.
256. Id. at 335.
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recognize trusts that meet the standard for express trusts.25 7
There are several objections to reading the neutral-principles analysis to
disallow trusts unless there is a clear expression of intent to create one.
First, many general churches claim the trust clauses adopted after the Jones
decision merely recognize longstanding principles of connectionalism
between national and local churches, and that applying a strict-neutral-
principles test allows disaffected parishes to escape the obligations of prior
commitments. 25  This contention is disputed, however, by those who
contend that a historical examination of both theological and organizational
principles reveals that the trust clauses are actually a break from prior
practice. 25 9 Lloyd Lunceford notes that "[i]f a binding trust asserted by the
national church in favor of itself over all local church property is essential to
Presbyterian connectionalism, it is curious that John Knox, John Calvin, and
the Book of Confessions are silent on the subject., 26 °
Furthermore, it could be argued that the relative lack of legal
sophistication in many religious groups, particularly on the local level, might
result in documents intended by the parties to create an express trust but
which would fall short of that level, in which cases courts would be
compelled to award the property contrary to the intent of the parties.26'
However, local churches are often incorporated under state law, and thus
have had occasion to retain counsel or otherwise increase their legal
sophistication. As church property lawsuits become more commonplace, it
is likely that local churches will pay greater heed to the effect of the
documents they draft and adopt, so this objection may be much weaker than
it first appears.
Adopting an approach that emphasizes uniformity of result, such as
strict hierarchical deference or the hybrid model, may allow both general
and local parties to more accurately predict the results of disaffiliation and
any accompanying litigation; however, such consistency comes at the price
of substantial unfairness to the parties, especially to local congregations
which under either of those approaches may be precluded from having their
arguments heard. Although all parties interested in minimizing government
involvement in religious affairs should be wary of standards that increase
257. Id. at 336-37; see also id. at 322 n.42 (citing numerous decisions of courts strictly applying
neutral principles of law, and describing the ways in which they determined the intent of the
settlors).
258. Dague & Stephens, supra note 35, at 134.
259. See, e.g., Lunceford, supra note 17, at 73-77.
260. Id. at 76.
261. Hansen, supra note 36, at 301-02.
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government scrutiny of internal matters, civil courts may be the only arbiters
who can resolve church property disputes on anything like neutral
grounds,2 62 and the strict-neutral-principles approach appears to comport
best with that conception of the forum.
IV. FUTURE TRENDS & IDEAS
Do the internal disputes of semi-hierarchical religious organizations like
the mainline Protestant denominations really matter? The answer appears to
be a qualified "yes." Membership and average worship attendance statistics
for these bodies have been declining steadily since the mid-Twentieth
Century,263 and the trend has continued in recent years.26 That said, the
historical significance of these denominations and their unique
organizational structures suggest that they are still at least moderately
influential in, or at least of interest to, American culture, and extensive news
coverage of their internal conflicts seems to confirm this. Given this
conclusion, it is worth devoting a few words to examining the current state
of affairs to see what the legal theories detailed above might yield.
A. Signs of an Impending Legal Tidal Wave
As noted above, the disaffiliation of individual congregations from
mainline Protestant churches is not at all a new trend, but there are some
signs suggesting that a more sizable wave of departures may be getting
underway, particularly in the context of The Episcopal Church. Apart from
the California lawsuits now before the Supreme Court of Califomia and the
262. For example, Justice Dennis, then of the Louisiana Supreme Court and currently a judge on
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, noted that
[r]efusal to adjudicate a dispute over property rights or contractual obligations, even
when no interpretation or evaluation of ecclesiastical doctrine or practice is called for, but
simply because the litigants are religious organizations, may deny a local church recourse
to an impartial body to resolve a just claim, thereby violating its members' rights under
the free exercise provision, and also constituting a judicial establishment of the
hierarchy's religion.
Fluker Cmt'y. Church v. Hitchens, 419 So. 2d 445, 447 (La. 1982) (citing Arlin M. Adams &
William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf- Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1980)).
263. Benton Johnson, Dean R. Hoge & Donald A. Luidens, Mainline Churches: The Real Reason
for Decline, FIRST THINGS, March 1993, at 13 ("But in the early 1960s [the mainline
denominations'] growth slowed down, and after the middle of the decade they had begun to lose
members . . . . By 1990 these denominations had lost between one-fifth and one-third of the
membership they claimed in 1965 and the proportion of Americans affiliated with them had reached
a twentieth-century low.").
264. See, e.g., PERRY CHANG, PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.), RECENT CHANGES IN
MEMBERSHIP AND ATTENDANCE IN MAINLINE PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONS 6 (2006); C. KIRK
HADAWAY, THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH CENTER, Is THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH GROWING (OR
DECLINING)? 6 (2004).
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Virginia lawsuits currently pending,265 there are signs that the national
church is preparing to take a more active role in asserting claims over the
property of departing congregations. The most recent previous Presiding
Bishop, Frank T. Griswold, had stated that as a matter of policy, property
disputes were a matter for resolution between local churches and their
regional dioceses. 266  However, in November 2006, David Booth Beers,
Chancellor to new Episcopal Presiding Bishop Katharine Jefferts Schori,
gave a presentation at a national gathering of a progressive Episcopal group,
at which he detailed ten recent cases in which TEC as a national body
asserted control over local church property, and predicted final judgment in
TEC's favor in every pending and future case.267 In February 2007, in
response to calls from the international Anglican community to end lawsuits
filed against disaffiliating American parishes, Mr. Beers reiterated TEC's
stance that all parish property is held in trust and refused to suspend
litigation.168  During the same period, seven regional dioceses have
requested some form of representation at international Anglican gatherings
apart from the official TEC delegation, which they contend is unable to
speak for them, and attempts to work out a compromise have failed
repeatedly.269
Although conflict within the PC(USA) may not have reached the same
level, there has been widespread criticism of some of the actions of the most
recent General Assembly in June 2006. The decision to allow local
exceptions to official standards which prohibit practicing gay and lesbian
clergy and other church officers was particularly controversial. 7 °  In
response, a number of churches have decided to disaffiliate, and some
observers expect a further increase in departures in light of a vote by
traditionalists within the PC(USA) to "realign" with the Evangelical
Presbyterian Church (EPC). The EPC is a separate denomination which in
June 2007 approved the creation of "transitional, non-geographic
265. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
266. Dennis Canon Diocesan Issue, Presiding Bishop Says, LIVING CHURCH, May 15, 2006,
http://www.livingchurch.org/publishertlc/viewarticle.asp?ID= 991.
267. Steve Waring, Chancellor: Episcopal Church Will Prevail in Communion and Courts,
LIVING CHURCH, Nov. 28, 2006, http://livingchurch.org/publishertlc/printarticle.asp?ID=2735.
268. Chancellor: Cessation of Lawsuits Must be Part of Comprehensive Agreement, LIVING
CHURCH, Feb. 27, 2007, http://www.livingchurch.org/publishertlc/viewarticle.asp?ID=3103.
269. George Conger & Steve Waring, Consensus on APO Requests Still Elusive, LIVING CHURCH,
Sept. 16, 2006, http://www.livingchurch.org/publishertlc/viewarticle.asp?ID=2485.
270. David E. Anderson, Vote Signals Changes for Presbyterians, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.),
June 24, 2006, at B8.
presbyteries" to receive formerly PC(USA) congregations.271  One
prominent example occurred in August 2006, when the governing session of
the 2,800-member Kirk of the Hills, a PC(USA) congregation in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, voted to leave the denomination.172  The Eastern Oklahoma
Presbytery of the PC(USA), to which Kirk of the Hills had belonged, had
anticipated such a move and had already claimed the church's property in
March 2006 affidavits.273 After the August vote, Kirk of the Hills filed suit
in civil court to quiet title. 74 The PC(USA) has prepared two legal
memoranda, dated December 2005, for the use of presbyteries seeking to
keep control of the property of departing congregations. 75  These
documents lay out the legal background, emphasize the hierarchical method
as preferable, and offer suggestions for implementing policies that will favor
the national church.276
Some of the earliest cases concerning departures of or determination of
property rights277 in both Episcopal and Presbyterian parishes in response to
recent events have already been decided, including actions in Alaska,
California, Louisiana, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina. 278  The widely varying results in these cases demonstrate the
271. Exodus of Churches, Members from the PCUSA, THE LAYMAN ONLINE, July 26, 2007,
http://www.layman.org/layman/news/2007-news/exodux-of-churches-members.htm.
272. Bill Sherman, Kirk Suit to Remain in District Court, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 27, 2006, at Al.
273. Id.
274. Id. The trend of large and prominent PC(USA) churches voting to depart the congregation
appears to be continuing; in January 2007, 2,000-member Signal Mountain Presbyterian Church in
Signal Mountain, Tennessee, voted by a margin of 1,172 to 10 to depart the PC(USA) and affiliate
with the Evangelical Presbyterian Church. Clint Cooper, Signal Church Votes for Ouster,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES/FREE PRESS, Jan. 29, 2007, at B2. Both the local church and the PC(USA)
are making claims to the property, so it seems likely that the matter will end up in court. Id.
275. John H. Adams, PCUSA Documents on Property: 'True Church' vs. 'Schismatics', THE
LAYMAN ONLINE, Aug. 9, 2006, http://www.layman.org/layman/news/2006-news/pcusa-documents-
on-property.htm.
276. Id.
277. Occasionally, local or general churches will bring suits seeking declaratory judgment as to
the property rights of the parties. This is not always in preparation for a departure from the
denomination-often, banks will be hesitant to lend money for expansion and other capital projects
where ultimate ownership of the property being offered as security is disputed or otherwise unclear.
278. St. Paul Church, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Alaska Missionary Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., 145 P.3d 541, 551 (Alaska 2006) (finding for general church); Rasmussen v.
Bunyan, No. 04CC00647 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County Sept. 9, 2005), Adair v. Poch, No.
BC321101 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Sept. 9, 2005), and O'Halloran v. Thompson, No.
BC321102 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Sept. 9, 2005) (finding for parish), all rev'd sub nom. In re
Episcopal Church Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845 (Ct. App. 2007), review granted, (Sept. 12, 2007);
First Presbyterian Church of the City of Baton Rouge v. Presbytery of South La., 19th Jud. Dist. Ct.,
Parish of E. Baton Rouge (Stipulated final judgment, Nov. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.fpcbr.org/clientfiles/editorfiles/Judgment(l).pdf (finding for parish); Presbytery of
Hudson River of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. Trs. of the First Presbyterian Church and
Congregation of Ridgeberry, 821 N.Y.S.2d 834, 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug 16, 2006) (finding for
parish); Daniel v. Wray, 580 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (finding for general church); In re
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unpredictability across jurisdictions engendered by the current state of the
law.
B. An Issue for the Supreme Court?
Although matters of property, trust, and contract law are generally
matters of state concern, the prevalence of religion in conflicts over church
property means that consideration by a civil court is likely to at least raise
federal issues about the application of the First Amendment.27 9 Further, the
methods adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court to avoid First Amendment
problems have been criticized as vague and in practice have given rise to
apparently inconsistent results among state courts purporting to apply the
same standard.28 ° Although states are free to differ in their application of
legal standards, the standards involved here derive from relatively recent
Supreme Court precedent. The constitutional principles at issue, combined
with the likelihood of a burgeoning docket of church property dispute cases,
suggest that it is at least possible that the Court might be presented with a
challenge to either hierarchical deference, neutral principles, or both in the
near future.
Several years ago, an expert in the area examined the jurisprudence of
the members of the Rehnquist Court in light of a hypothetical certiorari
petition in a church property case, to determine whether those justices would
be satisfied with the balance struck by Jones v. Wolf (allowing both
hierarchical-deference and neutral-principles-of-law), or whether, in light of
the commendation of the neutral-principles-of-law approach in that case,
there might be sufficient votes to totally jettison the hierarchical-deference
standard.2 8' His conclusion was that it was possible, given the Court's
personnel in 2000, that "a properly framed case before the Court might result
in the total abandonment of Watson in favor of neutral-principles.',
282
Church of St. James the Less, 888 A.2d 795 (Pa. 2005) (finding for general church); All Saints
Parish, Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of S.C., 595 S.E.2d 253 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2004) (vacating in part and reversing in part summary judgment in favor of parish).
279. Even application of the strict-neutral-principles approach raises questions, because courts
will be required to determine which documents it may examine and which are inescapably religious
or doctrinal in nature.
280. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
281. Kenneth E. North, Church Property Disputes: A Constitutional Perspective, Presentation at
the Duquesne University School of Law Jubilee International and Ecumenical Canon Law
Conference (Feb. 4-5, 2000), at 23, available at http://www.canonlaw.org/articlechurch%
20property%20disputes.htm.
282. Id.
However, the relative rarity of high federal courts ruling on church property
disputes meant that only two justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Stevens, had had an opportunity to vote in such a case (both were in the
majority in Jones, which favored neutral principles, and in dissent in
Milivojevich, in which the majority favored hierarchical deference).
Given the arrival of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito in place of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, respectively, it is possible
that a reconsideration of Mr. North's projection is warranted. Chief Justice
Roberts did not decide any cases concerning church property during his time
as a judge on the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and the Third Circuit
heard only one substantive church property dispute case during Justice
Alito's relatively lengthy tenure, and Justice Alito was not on the panel.283
Were a church property case to reach the Supreme Court, the
constitutionally acceptable standards could be restricted, expanded, or
redirected, and, depending on the result, could lead to clarification--or to
further confusion. The apparent trend in recent religion-clause jurisprudence
toward giving the states more flexibility in protecting or restricting religious
behavior 28 4 might suggest that the Court would continue to be comfortable
with a diversity of approaches.
C. The Possibility ofAlternative Resolution
Despite the heated rhetoric and continued legal struggles between
traditionalist and progressive factions in semi-hierarchical denominations,
there have been several high-profile instances of agreements to resolve
property issues. One of the first was a deal between Christ Church
Episcopal (Overland Park, Kansas) and the Episcopal Diocese of Kansas,
under which the traditionalist 2,200-member congregation agreed to pay the
progressive diocese over $1 million over a ten-year period in exchange for
the property. 285  Others followed, including 2,000-member Christ Church
(Plano, Texas) 286 and All Saints' (Dale City, Virginia), the latter departure
involving a transfer of title of the existing church facilities to the Diocese of
Virginia, followed by a five-year nominal lease of that property while the
congregation builds a new facility on land it had previously acquired, to
283. The case was Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference of African
Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 1996).
284. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
285. Parish Will Separate from the Episcopal Diocese and Denomination, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, Apr. 17, 2005.
286. George Conger, Christ Church, Piano, Leaves The Episcopal Church, LIVING CHURCH, Sept.
15, 2006, http://www.livingchurch.org/publishertlc/viewarticle.asp?ID=2484 (traditionalist parish
departing traditionalist diocese).
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which the Diocese agreed to relinquish any claim. 87 It should be noted that
these agreements were reached in the shadow of either pending or threatened
litigation and represent a de facto settlement based on each side's evaluation
of the other's case, in light of the facts at issue and the approach taken by the
relevant jurisdiction.
In a more preemptive and structural development, one generally
traditionalist diocese, the Diocese of the Rio Grande, which encompasses
most of New Mexico and parts of West Texas, proposed a plan to allow
congregations to depart with their property by paying a graduated declining
annual assessment for a period of years.288 Although the plan failed to
garner enough votes at the Diocesan Convocation,2 89 it does represent a
concerted effort to find a means of resolving potential future disputes that
does not require civil court involvement, and might provide a model for
preemptive dispute resolution going forward. Further, such means of
dispute resolution are consistent with scriptural teachings that all Christians
at least purportedly share, urging the avoidance of the civil courts in disputes
between Christians: "Is it so, that there is not among you one wise man who
will be able to decide between his brethren, but brother goes to law with
brother, and that before unbelievers? Actually, then, it is already a defeat for
you, that you have lawsuits with one another.
2 9 0
D. Significant External Matters
Several significant external factors that will profoundly impact the
future shape of semi-hierarchical religious groups in the United States bear
mention here. Obviously, the first of these is the underlying theological
disputes between advocates of the traditionalist and progressive positions
with regard to the interpretation and authority of scripture, and particularly
its implications for the role of gays and lesbians in TEC, the PC(USA), and
other semi-hierarchical religious bodies. Although these issues are hotly
287. Patrick Getlein, Diocese, Virginia Parish Reach Agreement on Property, LIVING CHURCH,
Nov. 10, 2006, http://www.livingchurch.org/publishertlc/printarticle.asp?[D=2744 (traditionalist
parish departing a diocese generally seen as moderate).
288. Episcopal Diocese of the Rio Grande, Resolution Five: "For Those Departing the Episcopal
Church" in Journal of the Fifty-Fourth Annual Convocation of the Episcopal Church in the Diocese
of the Rio Grande 38-39 (2006), http://www.dioceserg.org/index.php?option=comdocman&task
=docdownload&gid = 146.
289. Press Release, 54th Convocation of the Diocese of the Rio Grande (Oct. 15, 2006) (on file
with the author).
290. 1 Corinthians 6:5-7.
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disputed,2 9' they are by definition questions of religious doctrine, and thus
outside the jurisdiction of and improper for adjudication by American civil
courts.
Particularly for those in the Anglican tradition, the current debate also
involves a dispute over whether to reorganize along doctrinal as opposed to
exclusively geographic lines. Historically, each geographic area (whether
national or trans-national province, regional diocese, or local parish) was
under the jurisdiction of one officially recognized Anglican structure, and
leaders of other such structures were not permitted to exercise authority
outside their own borders. The congregations that have departed TEC have
not become strict congregationalists; rather, they have voted to place
themselves under the oversight of foreign bishops, such that, for example,
the parishes that left the Diocese of Los Angeles in 2004292 have aligned
with the Diocese of Luweero in the Anglican Church of Uganda.293 In a
similar manner, the eleven parishes departing the Diocese of Virginia in late
2005 and early 2006294 have joined the Convocation of Anglicans in North
America (CANA), a missionary effort of the Anglican Church of Nigeria.295
Whether these arrangements are valid or have historic precedent is a matter
of no small debate in the Anglican world, and will profoundly impact the
shape of the global Anglican Communion in the decades ahead.
Finally, the steep numerical decline in the mainline denominations,
perhaps exacerbated by the departures of more dissatisfied congregations,
shows no signs of abating.296 If the trend continues, as appears likely, it will
have an increasing impact on the relevance of the mainline churches and
their disputes to American culture at large, and the legal system in particular.
V. CONCLUSION
Church property disputes will never be the bread and butter of the civil
courts, but that does not mean controversies do not arise on a regular basis.
In 1998, Professor Greenawalt noted that courts have issued reported
decisions in an average of about 119 church property cases each decade
since 1948.297 The numbers reflect slight increases during periods of
291. See, e.g., supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
293. Bob Williams, Presiding Bishop Conveys Concern about Pastoral Boundaries, Affirms L.A.
Bishop's Ministry of Reconciliation, EPISCOPAL NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 25, 2004,
http://www.episcopalchureh.org/3577_49191_ENGHTM.htm; Diocesan Digest-Los Angeles:
Bishop Responds to Parishioners' Alignment with Uganda, EPISCOPAL NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 16,
2006, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/3577 71902_ENGPrint.html (second item).
294. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
295. Walker, supra note 9.
296. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
297. Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 1844 n. 1. Professor Greenawalt's findings are as follows:
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particular doctrinal disputation. In the decade since Professor Greenawalt's
tabulation, there were approximately 91 church property cases heard in the
U.S.; 298 this figure is consistent with earlier trends and may suggest the
number of cases might be rising again, perhaps in response to the increase in
intradenominational strife described above.
Most commentators point out that churches, both general and local,
could most easily avoid being dragged into civil court in the first place by
rewriting their documents to more clearly express their intent should there be
a dispute over property. Churches have not ordered their affairs in ways that
lend themselves to easy civil court resolution. There are at least two reasons
churches have not done so. First, because courts are using and will probably
continue to use two standards and many more variants, all of different
vintage and some of which are changed by courts from time to time,
churches are unsure how to structure their relationships in a manner that
would allow them to avoid going to court. The second reason has more to
do with the nature of religious belief, and more particularly an inherent
element that stands in stark contrast to secular corporations and other
nonreligious organizations. Most secular organizations unabashedly weigh
the possibility of failure when deciding on a course of action. In contrast, an
integral part of the nature of the belief systems of religious communities is
the hope that their shared beliefs will make their temporal unity lasting and
secure. Even when history suggests that schism is more likely than not, such
a pessimistic view, however realistic, is a terrible starting point for any
religious group.
Contemporary reports continue to suggest a deep and increasing tension
between general churches and local congregations who disagree with the
direction in which their parent bodies are tending.2 99 Parties on both sides
The following data show the approximate number of reported cases in both federal and
state courts over a period of fifty years (amassed through a Westlaw search). The
numbers reflect each time a different court had to address the issue of church property;
thus, appeals are counted separately. From 1948 to 1957, there were approximately 166
cases; from 1958-1967, roughly 109; from 1968-1977, 115 cases; from 1978-1987, 123
cases; from 1988-1997, 81. (This search was done in Oct. 1998, in the "Allcases"
database).
Id.
298. This search was conducted in January 2007, using the criteria discussed in the previous note.
It reflects only nine years rather than a full decade, and thus will almost certainly under-represent the
actual figure for the ten years following Professor Greenawalt's search.
299. See, e.g., Ann Rodgers, Churches Looking to Leave Presbytery, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Mar. 4, 2007, at A-1 (describing plans being laid by six churches in Allegheny County, as
part of a broader movement within the PC(USA), to leave that denomination and affiliate with the
more traditionalist Evangelical Presbyterian Church).
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are realizing that the unspoken truce on the question of property ownership,
though perfectly adequate in more harmonious times, may soon be broken.
The competing claims of the parties may soon be put to the test before a
judge who in any case is constitutionally barred from understanding and
weighing the fullness of the disagreement.
These lawsuits, which often sap the resources of religious institutions
and make adversaries of people who have long been fellow worshippers,
may sometimes seem all but inevitable. If this is so, the courts should resist
the urge to seize upon the hierarchical-deference standard for the sake of
predictability at the cost of fairness to all the parties involved. Instead,
courts should choose the neutral principles approach and strictly apply it,
thereby charting a course that keeps the parties on equal footing whenever
possible in resolving past ambiguities, but also encourages those now
formulating or reformulating their relationships to be realistic about what
might lie ahead, and come to a consensus on the outcome in the event a
schism occurs. In doing so, both courts and religious organizations would
be acknowledging the inherent limitations of all human institutions-
perhaps especially those in which mere mortals seek to be faithful to a
higher calling.
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